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Digital platforms and their success stories during the last twenty plus years have yielded 
questions on how such corporate fairytales come into existence. One of the critical 
decisions when building a successful digital platform is pricing. Pricing in digital 
platforms has been studied by a number of different scholars. The pricing models 
presented in academic literature vary from qualitative to very quantitative. Pricing models 
can be a listing of decisions or a mathematical model to determine the optimal price 
points for a digital platform.  
     The research questions for this study are: How do digital platform companies with a 
delivery service determine correct price points for their service? Can a digital platform 
with a delivery service make accurate pricing decisions based on a qualitative model? In 
this study, I research pricing methods in digital platform companies, with an emphasis on 
companies with a delivery service. The case company in this study is a European three-
sided digital platform with a delivery service. The evidence from the case company 
contributes to this study greatly, by providing an example from a real-life pricing model. I 
am able to present their pricing procedure in detail in this study.  
     The goal of the study is to present pricing models from existing academic literature. The 
pricing models presented in this study are qualitative and quantitative. I compare the 
academic pricing models to the one in case company. The contribution of this thesis is to 
examine and present pricing models of digital delivery platforms. This study presents a 
unique finding in the context of pricing models for digital platform with a delivery service.  
There is evidence for the correctness of the case company’s pricing model with comparable 
results from another model, and evidence on how the model has performed historically.  
     The method of the study is qualitative, and interview based. The most important 
finding of this study is the case company’s unique method of data collection for their 
pricing procedure. This finding sets it apart from existing models in the field. The 
restrictions of the study are related to the generalization of the case company’s pricing 
model and the potential misrepresentation of corporate specific pricing models in 
academic literature.  
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Tiivistelmä 
Digitaaliset alustat ovat viimeisten yli 20 vuoden aikana herättäneet kiinnostusta 
uskomattomilla kasvutarinoilla sekä herättäneet myös pelkoa niiden ottaessa isoja osia 
markkinoista, nykyisiltä perinteisen mallin yrityksiltä. Yksi oleellinen päätös ja mietinnän 
aihe digitaalisissa alustoissa ovat hinnoittelupäätökset. Alan tutkijat ovat maininneet juuri 
hinnoittelupäätökset yhdeksi tärkeimmistä päätöksistä rakennettaessa alustayritystä. 
Hinnoittelumalleja on niin kvalitatiivisia kuin kvantitatiivisiakin.  
     Tutkimuskysymykseni ovat: Miten monipuoleiset, digitaaliset kuljetusalustayritykset 
tekevät oikeita hinnoittelupäätöksiä palvelulleen? Voiko digitaalinen kuljetusalusta tehdä 
tarkkoja hinnoittelupäätöksiä kvalitatiivisella hinnoittelumallilla? 
     Tässä tutkimuksessa keskitytään digitaalisten kuljetusalustojen hinnoittelumalleihin. 
Tapausyritys on kolmipuoleinen eurooppalainen digitaalinen kuljetusalusta. Esittelen 
tässä tutkimuksessa tapausyrityksen hinnoittelumallin yksityiskohtaisesti. Se toimii 
esimerkkinä todellisen maailman hinnoittelumallista. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on esittää 
olemassa olevia teoreettisia hinnoittelumalleja sekä liiketoimintaa harjoittavan yrityksen 
käytössä oleva malli. Työssäni vertailen myös näitä malleja keskenään.   
     Tutkimuksen tieteellinen kontribuutio on esitellä digitaalisten kuljetusyritysten 
hinnoittelumalleja, sekä tapausyrityksen hinnoittelumalli kokonaisuudessaan. 
Tutkimuksessa esittelen uudentyylisen hinnoittelumallin verrattuna nykyiseen 
tutkimukseen digitaalisissa kuljetusalustoissa. Tukea tapausyrityksen mallin 
toimivuudesta tuovat toisen mallin vertailutulokset sekä taulukko tapausyrityksen mallin 
ennusteista verrattuna toteutuneisiin hintoihin.   
     Työ on kvalitatiivinen ja tehty haastattelemalla tapausyrityksen edustajaa useampana 
eri ajankohtana. Tutkimuksen vaikuttavin löydös on tapausyrityksen kohtuullisen 
ainutlaatuinen tiedonkeräämismenetelmä hinnoittelua varten. Tutkielman rajoitukset 
liittyvät pitkälti tulosten yleistettävyyteen, koska erilaisia digitaalisia alustayrityksiä on 
melko paljon. Myös tämän tutkimuksen ainutlaatuisena pitämäni löydös saattaa johtua 
osittain yritysten haluttomuudesta kertoa hinnoitteluprosesseistaan julkisesti.  
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Terminology 
 A platform company – Company that facilitates at least two different participating groups 
A digital platform – Internet based platform  
Two-sided online platform - A digital platform with two groups of participants  
Platform participating group – a group of participants to a platform with similar needs 
from the platform. E.g. accommodation seekers in Airbnb platform.  
Network effect – the effect that an additional user of a product or service, has on the current 
users.   
Network externalities – same as network effect  
Positive network effect - if the entrance of a new user causes the marginal utility of existing 
users to increase, this is called a positive network effect. This means that, the  a user’s 
benefit is an, “increasing function of the number of other users” (Moffat, 2019) 
Negative network effect - if the entrance of a new user, causes the marginal utility of 
existing users to decrease, this is called a negative network effect.  
Chicken-egg problem – in this context it means that a platform needs to gather both sides 
of users simultaneously and it is hard to get started trying to attract one side without any 
participants on the other side.   
Pipeline company – a traditional company, not a platform company 
Pricing strategy – The pricing strategy of a company, including pricing models and 
singular price level decisions.  
Pricing model – A company can have multiple pricing models in use for different types of 
situations and still be part of one pricing strategy.  
Price level decision – A price point decision within a certain pricing model 
Homing costs – costs related to being accustomed to a new platform 
Switching costs – costs related to switching from one platform to a fairly similar one  
Winner take all propensity – In platform economy this means that the first successful 
platform is likely to grasp a great share of the market, leaving little to others, even if faced 
with tough competition. 
Multihoming – Participating to more than one similar platform at a time 
Platform participant (user) groups – Platform user groups have a common interest towards 
the platform, e.g. ride seekers in Uber is a platform participant group. 
Two-sided markets – a general term, referring to markets which are characterized by 
platform companies. Credit cards, TV-channels, shopping malls. (Armstrong 2016)  
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1 Introduction 
Digital platforms have existed since the early 1990’s1. Their baffling disruption power to 
existing industries through technological innovation and mass scale, has caught the eye of 
the businesspeople as well as academics alike (Furth, 2018; Hagiu, 2009; Still et al., 2017). 
Today, digital platforms are present in nearly every market (Cusumano, Yoffie, & Gawer, 
2020). ”Platforms are economically important and widely observed in modern economies” 
(Anderson, Parker, & Tan, 2014). Companies such as Amazon, Google, Facebook, 
Microsoft Windows2, Alibaba and eBay are case examples of successful digital platforms. 
These companies have paved the way for digital platforms and their role in global 
economy as the new normal in many traditional industries. The power of platforms and 
digital platforms lies in their ability to bundle resources and reduce search costs (Hagiu, 
2014; Series, 2018). Building a successful digital platform is however the exception rather 
than the norm (Hagiu, 2012). According to Evans & Schmalensee (2016), the reasons why 
digital platforms are now a timely phenomenon, are the technological advancements of 
modern business. The modern information technology enables the effective use of data 
which is a key contribution in platform value creation (Van Alstyne, Parker, & Choudary, 
2016). The technological advancements do not however ensure the successfulness of the 
platform company model. For a platform company to thrive, careful planning and key 
strategic decisions are needed to be made, among them, pricing (Hagiu, 2014). 
From the many features unique to platform companies, pricing has been mentioned 
to be the most critical one (Eisenmann, Parker, & Alstyne, 2006). Pricing in digital 
platforms has been studied by various scholars starting with the pioneers in the field 
Rochet & Jean (2003), to many other scholars studying quantitative and qualitative pricing 
models. The urge to understand more in-depth platform companies and their success, 
seems to have driven academic research, but serves also as a clear motivation for this 
study. Besides being mentioned as one of the most critical decisions that managers need to 
consider when building a successful platform company, pricing in platform companies, has 
been mentioned to be more complicated than in traditional companies (Eisenmann et al., 
 
1 Amazon can be considered as one of the first digital platforms, founded in 1994. 
2 Microsoft in itself is not a platform as a company, but its operation system, Windows is a 
textbook example of a platform.  
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2006). These artefacts have contributed to the decision to choose digital platforms’ pricing 
models, as the topic for this study.  
Studying pricing in digital platforms with a delivery service gets encouraging 
support from academic literature. According to Sun, Teunter, Babai, and Hua (2019), 
platforms with a delivery service have pricing power, compared to other types of 
platforms. Delivery platforms deliver physical goods or people in the context of this study.  
In this thesis, a case company is utilized. The case company is a European three-
sided digital platform with a delivery service. Their pricing model and procedure is 
presented in detail in this study. To richen the study and to put the case company’s pricing 
model into context, eight additional pricing models from existing literature are presented. 
Three of these models are mentioned to be especially in the context of digital platforms 
with a delivery service. These models are presented by Kung & Zhong (2017), Riquelme, 
Banerjee and Johari (2015) and Sun et al. (2019). The other five models are from platform 
context, but not explicitly from platform delivery context. This does not mean that these 
models cannot be considered in delivery context, they are just not explicitly from that 
context.    
The case company provides essential evidence to this research. Their pricing model 
from real life is presented in detail. They use their pricing model to price the company’s 
service in over 50 different locations across Europe, with seven pricing decisions to be 
made per each location. With the evidence from the case company, it is possible to show a 
pricing decision process from end to end. The model takes into account consumers’ 
different tastes for product variety, income backgrounds and price elasticities of demand. 
Pricing in platforms is a complex matter and the initial prices with which the service 
is opened, carry a significant importance. Platform pricing starts with figuring out at least 
two prices, one for the buyer side and one for the seller side. For correct pricing decisions, 
platform companies must estimate the overall growth potential of the platform, the 
expected demand on each side of the platform and the price elasticity of demand for all of 
its distinct user groups, among other things. In addition to these, platforms need to 
incentivize, subsidize and monetize correctly. The fact that pricing decisions in platform 
companies are interdependent of each other, (Bardey, Cremer, & Lozachmeur, 2014), adds 
yet another level of complexity to platform pricing. Lastly, there can be several pricing 
decisions to be made within one platform participant group. For example, as mentioned 
earlier, in the case company of this study there are a total of 7 pricing decisions to be made 
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for every new location. From these seven pricing decisions, 4 are done to one platform 
participant group only, the chauffeurs (Steven, 2018).  
 
 Research objectives and questions  
To study digital platform pricing, a total of 9 pricing models are studied in this thesis. The 
emphasis being on platforms with a delivery service. One of the models is from the case 
company. The study’s crucial input is to research the pricing decision-making process as 
well as the models in digital platforms. The research questions are: 
 
How do digital platform companies with a delivery service determine correct price points 
for their service? 
Can a digital platform with a delivery service make accurate pricing decisions based on a 
qualitative model? 
The research questions reflect the core focus of this study. Presenting different types 
of pricing models of digital platforms and evaluating them, is the main contribution of this 
study. Beyond this, the second research question answers to a more specific problem 
setting. As the second question is much narrower, the data from the case company provides 
the most compelling evidence for it. The different pricing models in the study allow a 
comparison between the pricing models from academia and the one from the case 
company.  
The contribution of the study is to present pricing models found from academic 
literature and describe in detail the case company’s equivalent. Platform entrepreneurs can 
use this study for the purposes of comparing pricing models, or to evaluate a suitable 
pricing model for their platform. 
 
 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework for this study is based on digital platforms and their unique 
corporate structures which to a great extent affect the pricing models. “Under 
multisidedness, platforms must choose a price structure and not only a price level for their 
service” (J.-C. Rochet & Jean, 2003). This quotation describes well the theoretical 
framework of this study. Platforms must consider a complete pricing structure and not only 
individual price levels. This framework illustrates the different levels of decision-making 
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in platform pricing structures. This framework helps to understand the three different 
layers in platform pricing.  
 
• The first level in platform pricing is the pricing process. This means all the 
tools and methods that a platform uses to set their prices.  
• The second level is the pricing model. This is a specific pricing model that a 
platform uses. An example of this is membership-based fee versus 
transaction-based fee.  
• The third level in pricing are the results of the two previous steps, the final 
prices.  
 
Figure 1 Different levels in platform pricing 
 
The model progresses towards more granular and specific from left to right 
 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is comprised of 6 different sections. The first section in this thesis is 
introduction. The second chapter is the literature review. In the third part I present the 
research design and methodology. The fourth chapter is about the case company and their 
business model, revenue logic and their pricing procedure and model. In the fifth part I 
analyze the case company’s model and present four other pricing models from platform 
context. In the sixth part I present the study results and discuss the generalization of the 
study’s results, as well as the restrictions of the study. In literature review the focus will be 
on introducing platforms, digital platforms and different digital platform pricing models. 
The presentation of the case company’s pricing model captures deserved fully a lot of 
Pricing process
• Tools & 
methods 
used in 
pricing.
Pricing Model
• Qualitative 
vs. 
Quantitative
Price levels
• individual 
price points 
generated 
from the 
price model.
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attention in this thesis, as the access to the case company enables firsthand evidence from 
their pricing procedure. Three models in literature review are researched explicitly in 
delivery platform context; (Kung&Zhong, 2017; Sun et al., 2019; Riquelme et al., 2015) 
and the rest of the models in other platform contexts. In this study, a delivery platform 
means a platform that delivers something physical; food, goods or people.  
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2 Literature Review  
Platforms are platforms, whether they are digital or not. According to Hagiu (2014), 
“MULTISIDED PLATFORMS (MSPS) are technologies, products or services that create 
value primarily by enabling direct interactions between two or more customer or 
participant groups.” (Hagiu, 2014). This describes the multisided nature of platforms. 
Another description for two-sided markets and platforms is provided by Eisenmann et al. 
(2006), “products and services that bring together groups of users in two-sided networks 
are platforms” (Eisenmann et al., 2006). These examples show that, platforms can be two-
sided or multisided. The definition by Hagiu (2014), does not specify the number of sides 
in multisided platforms. It refers to two-sided and multisided. However, for a platform to 
be a platform it must have at least two sides, otherwise it is not a platform (Hagiu, 2014).   
A digital platform is a platform company that utilizes modern IT technologies in its 
operations (Evans & Schmalensee, 2016; Van Alstyne et al., 2016). The focus of this study 
is on digital platforms with a delivery service. A digital platform with a delivery service in 
this study means a platform that delivers something tangible, i.e. people, food or goods.  In 
the case of people transporting, the platforms are usually referred to as ride-hailing 
platforms, such as Uber and Lyft. When delivering goods, this means companies such as 
Instacart and Amazon. Some features of pricing and platform structure are unique to 
delivery platforms. However, there are still quite many characteristics that exist both in 
digital and non-digital and in all types of platform companies. Next is an example of a 
problem, common to all types of platforms. This problem is important to understand as it is 
closely related to pricing in platforms.   
A characteristic problem of all platforms alike is called a chicken-and-egg problem. 
The example from credit card industry describes this problem and how it was solved. The 
first successful credit card was introduced by Bank of America in 1958 (Wikipedia, 2019). 
For credit cards, the chicken and egg problem was the following, how to get one 
participating group (merchants) to start accepting a credit card as a payment method, while 
there were no card users using the card yet. Bank of America solved this problem by 
sending credit cards to 60,000 of its then current customers and then convincing merchants 
to accept the card as a payment method. This way Bank of America was able to get enough 
users on one side of the platform and then convince the other participant group to start 
accepting the card as a payment method. This demonstration, although from a non-digital 
platform, describes purposefully the very distinctive problem that all platforms, digital and 
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non-digital face and must solve. The example also shows how closely this problem is 
related to platform pricing. Bank of America knew that they have to incentivize the use of 
the card through pricing in order to get one side of the platform aboard first. Bank of 
America decided to give the credit cards for free to its current users, this way heavily 
incentivizing the card’s use as a payment method. After this, convincing the merchants was 
easier as there were already users willing to make payments with the card. The chicken-
and-egg problem happens in the early phases of any platform and pricing plays an 
important role in solving it. A decision not to charge a certain amount i.e. subsidizing, is 
also a pricing decision as the above example demonstrates. When tackling this problem, 
platform companies usually ask questions such as: which users to subsidize, which users to 
charge and for how long. In addition to attracting enough users on each side of the 
platform, it is usually required to grow the platform user groups at an equal pace, otherwise 
there will be dissatisfaction among some of the platform users, as there is no demand for 
their supply. To succeed in this, pricing must be done as accurately as possible.  
Many of the dynamics concerning platforms are true to both digital and non-digital 
alike, as is supported by Evans and Schmalensee (2016),  “All matchmakers play by 
similar rules. But the rules are different than those for traditional firms” (Evans & 
Schmalensee, 2016). Evans and Schmalensee (2016) refer to platforms as matchmakers, 
another term used in academia for platforms. In the context of pricing Weyl (2010) 
develops this categorization further. He states that pricing for credit cards and newspapers 
have clear differences, “despite credit cards and newspapers both being canonical two-
sided markets, the economics of these industries seem intuitively quite different” (Weyl, 
2010). This intuition he further fortifies in his study. 
In academic literature, it is usually stated whether the study is focusing on two-sided 
or multiple sided platforms or markets. From my perspective, scholars use two-sided 
markets intertwined with two-sided platforms. Some of the pricing models studied in this 
thesis are explicitly mentioned to be for two-sided markets. The applicability of pricing 
models mentioned to be for two-sided platforms to three-sided platforms, can still be valid, 
as some of the three-sided platforms have the same functionalities than the two-sided ones, 
e.g. Uber (two-sided delivery platform) and Amazon (three-sided delivery platform3). 
 
3 Amazon is a three-sided delivery platform when its customers buy products not made by 
Amazon, but by third parties. 
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 Pricing in digital platforms have been studied by various scholars, from various 
points of views. Rochet & Jean (2003) made their pioneering work, “Platform competition 
in two-sided markets” focusing mostly on non-digital platforms, such as credit cards and 
video game consoles. They state that, markets with network externalities are often based 
on platform companies. In addition, they point out a very insightful fact about platforms 
and the nature of their pricing procedure, “Under multisidedness, platforms must choose a 
price structure and not only a price level for their service” (Rochet & Jean, 2003). This 
characterization of platform pricing by Rochet & Jean (2003) is a very accurate one and 
describes vividly the purpose of my study. Before platform companies can figure out 
individual price points for their service, they must or should, choose a pricing structure.   
In his article, "Price theory of multi-sided platforms" Weyl (2010) examines the 
pricing theories of multi-sided platforms extensively and thoroughly. In the paper, he 
approaches the topic from the viewpoint of one single platform participant. He studies 
pricing by, “choosing participation rates for the two sides of a platform rather than prices 
to support the allocation of demand” (Weyl, 2010).  He presents a formula of how user 
utility can be presented in dollar value and thus be used as the basis of pricing. A key 
contributing metric in the model is network effects of platforms.  A user’s utility from a 
platform can vary quite a lot, but network effects can be used to calculate utilities more 
effectively.  
Riquelme et al. (2015) study in their paper, “Pricing in Ride-share Platforms: A 
Queueing-Theoretic Approach” the role and performance of dynamic pricing over static 
pricing. They introduce in their paper a, “queueing-theoretic economic model to study 
optimal platform pricing” (Riquelme, Banerjee, & Johari, 2015). Their key findings are 
that a platform’s performance will not be better under any given dynamic pricing strategy 
over static pricing. On the other hand, they mention that dynamic pricing is, “more robust 
to fluctuations in system parameters” (Riquelme et al., 2015). This means that dynamic 
pricing does not necessarily bring better results but may work better with changing and 
imperfect data. This pricing strategy enables platforms to use dynamic pricing to maximize 
the platform profits as effectively as an optimal static model would (Riquelme et al., 2015).   
 
 
Literature Review 9  
 
 
 
Figure 2  How multisided platforms differ from product platforms and resellers (Hagiu 2014) 
 
From the above figure we can understand that a multisided platform (MSP), is a 
facilitator of communication, the pooler of resources and a reducer of search costs (Hagiu, 
2014). One key difference between traditional companies and platforms is the amount of 
communication that a platform facilitates. A platform is in contact to all its platform 
participants groups and in addition, facilitates and regulates the communication among the 
platform participating groups. For all platform participants, the pricing must be thought 
through. The hardest part in platform pricing is to predict the demand on each side of the 
platform and the groups’ price sensitivity. On top of this, platform operators should know 
which platform participant groups bring the most value with their presence to the platform. 
These aspects must be considered before opening the platform for business. As platforms 
communicate with all the sides and the sides communicate with each other, the platforms 
are also the rule setters, and one of the most important rules in it, is pricing this 
communication. (Hagiu, 2014) 
In the early phases of platforms, the companies usually seek for volume in 
transactions. According to the case company representative, it is the only way towards 
profitability (Steven, 2018). According to Zhu & Furr (2016) every platform needs a 
critical mass of users to start operating profitably. Before this critical mass of users on each 
side of the platform is achieved, significant incentives may need to be used, in order to 
ensure enough traction on each side of the platform. Incentives are important pricing 
decisions in the early phases of platforms (Evans & Schmalensee, 2010). Usually the next 
phase in platform pricing after incentives, is subsidization. Incentivizing and subsidization 
can be seen being the same thing, as they both incentivize the use of a platform. 
Incentivizing is anything that encourages the use of a platform and subsidizing is not 
charging the full price for a certain transaction in the platform. The difference is that, there 
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can be other incentives to use a platform than price reductions. To subsidize correctly, the 
platform operators should know the platform side that generates the most value by its 
presence and focus on subsidizing them. This is thinking is supported by Eisenmann et al. 
(2016), “the platform provider sets prices for that side below the level it would charge if it 
viewed the subsidy side as an independent market” (Eisenmann et al., 2006). Generally, 
the case is, that one side of the platform is more valuable to the platform than other sides. 
(Eisenmann et al., 2006). 
The last part of pricing in platforms is monetization. This part of the pricing is done, 
or should be done the earliest, once the critical mass of users has been reached. Once the 
platform provides enough value to its users and additionally, changing to another similar 
platform becomes more and more inconvenient, only then are platforms in a reasonable 
position to start effectively monetizing the transactions on the platform. This is a 
challenging point in the journey of platform pricing. In the beginning of pricing, there 
needs to be enough incentives for platform users, which usually means poor profitability 
for the platform operators and once the monetization phase starts, it typically means raising 
prices for current users and raising prices is always received with a slight negative reaction 
which can cause some users to leave the platform. To ease out the pain of increased prices, 
one pricing strategy is to provide a free option and a chargeable (premium) subscription to 
the same platform. This pricing model is called a freemium model. In this pricing model, 
the basic functions of the service continue to be free for the users, while e.g. 
advertisement-free usage of the service becomes chargeable or supplemental features are 
provided to the same service. This leaves the users with a freedom to choose of whether to 
continue with the free account or to upgrade to a chargeable account. From the platform’s 
point of view, the premium accounts are usually the more profitable option, but utilizing an 
incremental change in pricing, does not jeopardize the important current user base. Spotify 
uses this pricing strategy. With this pricing model, Spotify is able to monetize on some of 
its users directly and through advertisers on the free account users. If a platform does not 
reach the critical mass and starts implementing full fees on its users, it assumes a serious 
risk of losing the existing users and risks them changing to a more value-adding platform 
or to start using a substituting service once and for all, not necessarily even a platform, e.g. 
using a traditional taxi company instead of using ride-sharing platforms.    
The market conditions that platform companies operate in, are also hugely important 
when determining the optimal pricing structures. The most common competitive 
landscapes are a monopolistic, duopolistic and competitive landscape. The effect of these 
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situational conditions to price levels and sometimes even to pricing models has been 
studied by Armstrong (2006). On a quick thought, one could assume that a monopolistic 
market position might mean for a platform to be able to charge higher prices. 
Unfortunately this can be a false conclusion, as modern platforms tend to  be disrupting 
traditional industries and the decision to charge premium prices, can result in users 
abandoning the platform service model as too expensive, as they are not yet familiar 
enough with the service and their user utility is not on the same level as the price would 
suggest.  
In platform pricing the price elasticity of demand is an important concept to be taken 
into account (Bolt & Tieman, 2011; Rochet & Jean, 2003). Users on each side of the 
platform, represent different levels of price elasticity (sometimes referred to as price 
sensitivity) to the same service. Krueger (2009) studies the topic through the much debated 
finding of Rochet & Tirole (2003 & 2006), “the more elastic group of customers will be 
charged more” (Krueger, 2009). Krueger (2009) later presents in his study that platforms 
will raise prices for markets traditionally considered inelastic and lower prices for markets 
considered to be elastic. The findings of Krueger (2009 is in contradiction to the finding of 
Rochet & Tirole (2003 & 2006). Despite the debate in academic literature about this 
finding by Rochet & Tirole (2003 & 2006), there is a true challenge for platforms to decide 
a certain market’s price elasticity for demand for each user group of the platform as it is an 
undeniable driver of prices in platforms, as can be seen from the comparison of results 
from Krueger (2009) and Rochet & Tirole (2003&2006) to the topic. In regard to price 
elasticity of demand in platform pricing, the pricing model of the case company is one of 
the most impressive ones in its ability to measure price elasticities of demand of its users. 
The case company operates in tens4 of different locations, which requires detecting more 
than 150 different price elasticities of demand for its three user groups. This requires the 
ability to price the service accurately and effectively time and time again.  
 Digital Platforms 
A digital platform is said to be a platform company that utilizes modern IT technologies in 
its operations (Evans & Schmalensee, 2016; Van Alstyne et al., 2016). According to Still 
et al. (2017) digital platforms create value by providing, “greater accessibility, speed, 
 
4 The case company operates in more than 50 different locations across Europe and has 
three distinct user groups (sides) in its platform. (Steven, 2019b) 
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efficiency and sometimes an improved user experience, service and greater convenience 
compared to existing solutions” (Still et al., 2017). The same authors also credit the birth 
of digital platforms to the advancements in digitalization. In this context, digitalization can 
be seen as the use of internet. For example, a digital platform, Uber facilitates 
communication between ride-offerors and ride-seekers on its application. For the 
application to work, it must me be connected to internet in order to receive the locations of 
the ride-seeker and ride-provider. In this sense digital platforms leverage the use of modern 
technologies for higher efficiency and user friendliness. Facilitating communication, 
bundling resources and legalizing transactions can be seen as the main functions of digital 
platforms.  Still et al. (2017) describe this the following way, “Platforms are about making 
it easy and efficient for participants to connect and exchange” (Still et al., 2017). 
As digital platforms utilize modern IT technologies as their key component (Evans & 
Schmalensee, 2016), it can be concluded that digital platforms are a timelier phenomenon 
than non-digital ones. There are several different types of digital platforms; social digital 
platforms such as Instagram, Facebook, Snapchat and YouTube, marketplace digital 
platforms; Amazon, eBay, Etsy and Tori.fi, operating systems; OS and Android and then 
digital platforms with a delivery service such as Instacart and Uber. It is needed to clarify 
the nature of platforms that I study in this thesis. If one runs an academic search for 
“digital delivery platforms” the results are mainly concerning platforms that deliver digital 
content. An example of this type of platform would be Adobe PDF or any other type of 
platform providing something digital content as its service. This is however not the focus 
in this thesis. The focus of this thesis is on digital platforms with a delivery service, 
meaning platforms that transport something tangible as their service. These digital 
platform companies have a delivery service as a key functionality of their business. Such 
companies are food delivery companies such as: Uber Eats, Foodora and Instacart, ride 
sharing companies such as Uber and Lyft and also product platforms such as Amazon and 
eBay. 
In general, a company can be a pipeline company exclusively i.e. a traditional 
company, a platform company or a mixture of pipeline and platform business models. A 
company does not need to be necessarily either or (Van Alstyne et al., 2016). An example 
of a company that utilizes platform and pipeline company models simultaneously is 
Amazon, a digital platform company as well. This is possible because it sells and delivers 
some of its own products on its website, but a big share of the company’s revenue comes 
from third party sellers, that list their products on the Amazon web store for sale (Hagiu & 
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Wright, 2015). Digital platforms can be thought of as digital versions of their big brother, 
platform companies, which have existed for decades already5.  
The power of platforms is, that they pool resources that otherwise are too scattered to 
be used in a meaningful manner (Hagiu, 2014). As internet became more of the everyday 
life in the beginning of 1990s, soon after was born one of the first digital platforms, 
Amazon, in 1994. Amazon started out by selling books online, cutting the costs of a 
traditional bookstore, with no employed work force or a chain of physical sales locations. 
A bit more recent digital platform, Uber, is a transportation company with no expensive 
equipment to worry about. It pools together unused resources in a way that a person 
needing a ride, can safely use their service as he would use a regular taxi. Uber’s whole 
business model is based on the use of internet.  
 
2.1.1 Platform definition  
Some terminology used in academic research is useful to be presented here. First, a 
platform company is generally considered the same as a multisided platform (MSP). The 
term multisided refers to the number of different platform participant groups or “sides” that 
a platform company can have (Cusumano et al., 2020). For example, Uber has two “sides” 
i.e. ride providers and ride seekers. If Uber would have advertisers on its platform, the 
advertisers would be an additional platform participant group and Uber would become a 
three-sided platform. The common number of platform participant groups is either two or 
three. One platform that has been said to have more than three sides, is Facebook. The 
participant groups in Facebook are individual people, advertisers, developers and 
companies. For a company to be a platform by definition, there needs to be at least two 
different platform sides, otherwise it is not a platform company (Hagiu, 2014). If a 
company produces only goods manufactured by itself it is not a platform company, but a 
“one-sided platform” (Cusumano et al., 2020).  A platform participant group is a group of 
people with a shared and similar interest towards a platform, e.g. ride-seekers in Uber. 
Hagiu (2014) refers in his study to the aforementioned platform participant groups. 
The interaction between these groups is the value that platform companies bring. A very 
important point about platform value creation is the pooling of resources and legalization 
of pooling that Hagiu (2014) mentions. Good examples of this are Uber and Airbnb. These 
 
5 e.g. shopping malls, credit cards and newspapers 
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platforms not only pool resources, but also legalize the pooling and facilitate the peer-to-
peer interaction.  
 
2.1.2 Digital vs. non-digital platforms  
According to Eisenmann et al. (2006) “Products and services that bring together groups of 
users in two-sided networks are platforms.”(Eisenmann et al., 2006). According to Evans 
& Schmalensee (2010), platform businesses are significant in many web-based businesses. 
Non-digital platforms often do not utilize internet as a part of their service creation. Good 
examples of non-digital platform companies are credit cards and shopping malls. Good 
examples of digital platforms are Amazon, Google, Facebook and Uber. Some of the 
platforms such as operating systems, Microsoft Windows and OSX are usually considered 
digital platforms, even though they do function without internet. The participant groups of 
operating systems are software users and developers. Internet is used to update the 
software. In this sense, they can be considered digital platforms as well.  
 Fundamentals of platform pricing 
Eisenmann et al. (2006) present that pricing in platforms is more complicated than in 
traditional companies. Rochet & Jean (2003) illustrate the challenging nature of platform 
pricing, “Under multisidedness, platforms must choose a price structure and not only a 
price level for their service” (Rochet & Jean, 2003). In a bigger picture, a platform 
company has basically two options for its pricing strategy; aiming not to change the prices 
or aiming to raise prices at some point after the critical mass is reached. The more common 
strategy is to aim at raising prices after critical mass is reached. Platform companies, such 
as operating systems and gaming consoles follow the former strategy in their pricing. They 
do not charge customers later on for more to use the platform. In the case of operating 
systems, the initial price can be the only cost that the user will pay. For gaming consoles, 
the cost for the console is done only once, but there are games that users might buy later 
on. A platform can choose to sacrifice profitability maximization over growth in its early 
phases. This approach is used by the majority of platforms. The decision between the two 
pricing strategies, can be dictated by qualitative factors also, namely by how revolutionary 
the business concept is and what is the competitive landscape. A monopolistic market 
condition with a breakthrough idea can still be inadequate to use a pricing strategy that 
charges full price straight in the beginning of the use. 
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The more likely scenario for a platform is that, it attracts users with discounted prices 
and wait to monetize later on. This means that the price levels need to be changed and that 
the initial price that is charged for the use of a platform is not the only cost there will be. 
Raising prices is a tough situation to communicate to the users. That is why, platforms 
usually wait until they have enough users before starting to monetize.  The study by Kung 
and Zhong (2017) reflects the challenging but potentially rewarding nature of price setting 
strategies in platforms and the dependent nature of price setting, “The two pricing 
problems must be considered together to optimally provide incentives for shoppers and 
consumers to stay connected to the platform. This brings new challenges and great 
potential values to the investigation of platform pricing.” (Kung & Zhong, 2017). The two 
pricing problems that Kung & Zhong (2017) mention, mean the prices set for each user 
group in a platform and their correlative nature.  In this example there are two, but there 
can be more of those prices.  
Bakos & Katsamakas (2008) present in their paper the role of asymmetry in platform 
pricing. They state that, “Real-world two-sided networks often demonstrate several types 
of asymmetry” (Bakos & Katsamakas, 2008). As examples of this, they present different 
levels of network effect and participation prices among platform participant groups. This 
asymmetric nature of platform characteristics, according to the them, affects the pricing 
structures or at least price levels at platforms. This may result in receiving different 
revenues from the platform sides and due to this, “one side of the network may receive a 
larger fraction of the surplus created by the network.” (Bakos & Katsamakas, 2008). 
In their paper, Eisenmann et al. (2006) examine, “the factors that senior managers 
must consider in designing their platform’s business models. The key decision here is 
pricing” (Eisenmann et al., 2006). Furthermore, the authors state that platform pricing is 
challenging and provide an example from platform subsidization, “It is not always obvious 
which side–if either–the platform should subsidize and which it should charge” 
(Eisenmann et al., 2006). The argument of Eisenmann et al. (2006) receives support from 
Hagiu (2014) by saying that pricing is one of the success factors of digital platforms. 
Pricing as such is crucial in all types of businesses, but according to Eisenmann et al. 
(2006) its importance is even heightened in platforms. 
A platform by definition, is a place that simultaneously serves at least two participant 
groups with different needs. Pricing comes into play when a platform is trying to get its 
first participants to either side of the platform. If the price to enter the platform is too high 
for one side, there will be no participants on that side, which means that the other side is 
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not interested either, even if their price was not a problem. In platforms, the success builds 
on a fact, that there are enough participants on each side of the platform. 
A description of platform pricing is provided by Hagiu (2014), “Because MSPs serve 
multiple types of customers, they potentially have multiple revenues and profit sources ” 
(Hagiu, 2014). I think this is a good clarification and abstraction about platform pricing in 
general. The key issue for a platform to be successful in its pricing, is to take this statement 
into account and preferably identify all its revenue sources.  In platform companies there 
are always at least two sides, which means a minimum of two different types of customer 
groups.  
The nature of platforms is that cost and revenue streams can come from left and right 
(Hagiu, 2014). Eisenmann et al. (2006) also bring up the subsidization question. They 
mention that in most cases of platform companies, it makes sense to subsidize one side of 
the platform, but how to determine which side and for how long, is the open-ended 
question in their research. There are quite a few mathematical models presented in 
academic literature for platform pricing. In contrast to that, the pricing model from the case 
company builds its core information acquisition on unstructured and ex-tempore interviews 
of potential user group participants.  
Another role of pricing in platforms is that it becomes a strategic tool for 
competition, because implementing high switching costs between two similar platforms, 
increases the likelihood that customers will not change from the current service provider to 
a competing one (Hagiu, 2014). He clarifies, that these pricing strategies can be 
implemented on one side or all sides of a platform.  
 
2.2.1 User utility as a measurement for pricing decisions in platforms 
When products and services are priced in platform companies, many pricing models in 
academic literature approach it with user’s utility as the metric to be priced e.g. (Kung & 
Zhong, 2017; Weyl, 2010). In order to understand the concept of user utility, I will present 
a graph describing the user utility in traditional companies and in platform companies.   
When new products are introduced to markets in traditional companies, the prices are 
typically set at their highest level to reflect the value of the good. Once the product has 
been in the markets and new products are introduced, it is accustomed to give price 
reductions, in order to sell the inventory off before new arrivals and to reflect the 
decreased user utility. Quite the opposite logic can be seen happening in platform 
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companies, especially in new platforms. Platform companies usually start with a lower 
price to attract users and later on, as the user utility grows, monetize. The utility of users in 
platform companies is at its lowest at the time of joining the platform for the first time. 
However, once a platform company matures, new users are still incentivized to join the 
platform with e.g. free trial periods.  
User utility is often the dependent variable to which the price is reflected. In other 
words, utility is the benefit that a platform user receives by using the platform. To correctly 
price this, it is vital to understand and estimate the user utility for different user groups of 
the platform.  In traditional companies the expected user utility is on its highest level at the 
moment of purchase. Similarly, the price is at its highest level. The reduction in price 
happens, when the product becomes “old” and needs to be removed from the selection. 
This is related to perceived utility as the once new product does not seem that interesting 
and thus valuable anymore.  
In the early phases of platform companies, the expected utility and thus the prices are 
usually at their lowest. An example of this is YouTube. When it started, YouTube was free 
to use, and later on the first non-advertisement based payments were introduced in 2013 to 
the platform (BBC, 2013). As the utility that the platform offered, grew, it started 
implementing chargeable premium accounts to its platform. In his study, Taylor (2018) 
reflects user utility in delivery platforms, “Delay sensitivity reduces expected utility for 
customers” (Taylor, 2018). Delay sensitivity means the platform users’ sensitivity to 
waiting times. In the study, he researches expected utility, which is also a key attribute in 
the below illustration (Figure 3). In addition, he provides an example from a delivery 
platform where delay sensitivity affects the user’s expected utility.  
The utility for a new product can be divided into expected (often subjective or 
perceived) and realized utility. Furthermore, in this illustration platforms are always a 
service, because for example buying a product from Amazon can include looking at the 
reviews and transportation as part of the purchase event. 
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Figure 3 Pricing explained by user’s utility 
 
The initial time of purchase means the time when the first transaction occurs. In traditional 
companies, this means the time when a service or product is bought. In platform 
companies this can mean signing up for free to a certain platform and start using the 
service. In platforms, there can be additional points of purchases later on, as the value of 
the service grows to the users and they might upgrade to a premium subscription. This is a 
typical strategy for platform monetization.  The value creation and monetization happen at 
an opposite logic in platforms and traditional companies. In traditional companies the 
value is created beforehand, (expected utility) and thus the price is at its highest level at the 
time of initial purchase. In platforms, the expected utility and price are at their lowest at 
the time of initial purchase. 
When a person acquires an access to a platform, e.g. YouTube, his expectations for 
the service are typically relatively low, and thus willingness to pay for the service is low. 
Once the service is able to provide more and more value, the willingness to pay for it also 
increases. That is why platform companies use a lot of incentives before they can monetize 
more effectively on their users (Evans & Schmalensee, 2010). 
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2.2.2  Different pricing models in platforms 
In platform companies, growth is the way to profitability and thus investing in growth in 
the early phases of the platform is a common strategy. This affects to the choice of a 
pricing model. According to Evans & Schmalensee (2010) if,  “the critical mass constraint 
can be satisfied, growth generally follows, and the business can turn its attention to 
maximizing long-run profits” (Evans & Schmalensee, 2010).  A platform seeking growth 
and profitability in the long run, usually gives up on maximizing profitability before a 
critical mass of users is reached. This argument was supported e.g. by the case company 
interviewee. YouTube monetized first with advertisements and later on with premium 
subscription model (BBC, 2013). There are also other types of pricing models for 
platforms. Examples of these are a completely free services to users such as Facebook and 
Google, which monetize only through advertisers. As mentioned earlier there are also 
platforms that charge users a lump sum payment as soon as a user joins the platform. 
(operating systems and gaming consoles).   
One distinctive pricing model is charge-per-usage pricing structure. Charge per 
usage model means that there is no subscription fee or any other payment. Good examples 
of this strategy are Uber and Airbnb. A user only pays if he uses the service, not for the 
access to the platform. A mixture of pricing models within the same platform is also 
possible. Application shops for IOS and Android are examples of a combination of a 
completely free and chargeable model. It is free to join the application shop and some 
applications are free to download and some applications are also sold for money through 
the same platform.   
One of the greatest contributing factors to freemium pricing model is the so called 
“chicken and egg” problem in platforms. This problem is set to describe the logic that, in 
order to be able to charge platform participants for their access to the platform, the 
platform operators need to attract users to both sides of the platform. However, usually in 
the beginning, people are reluctant to join a platform, if there are no users on the other side 
of the platform. The freemium pricing model helps a platform to retain its current 
customers, while starting to monetize on customers that experience already a high utility 
from the platform. “Overcoming the chicken-and-egg problem is one of the most difficult 
challenges for many MSPs.” (Hagiu, 2014). 
Hagiu’s (2014) pricing model serves as a great example of a qualitative pricing 
model. In contrast to mathematical models, he presents a sort of a “checklist” for managers 
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that need to be considered to make correct pricing decisions. Even though this is a list of 
three guidelines, this can be considered as a qualitative pricing model.  
These guidelines are:  
• Charge a higher price from the platform participant group, that has less price 
sensitivity.  
• Charge more from the platform group, that benefits more from the presence of the 
other side or sides, if there is no priced transaction already existing between the two 
sides.  
• “If there is a priced transaction between two platform sides, then charge more from 
the side that can extract more value from the other side” (Hagiu, 2014). 
 
The last two points seem quite similar and frankly I could not distinct the two, but this is 
how Hagiu (2014) presents the issue. However, this is an example of a pricing model that 
is considered qualitative in this study. 
Kung & Zhong (2017) on the other hand build a mathematical model for digital 
platforms with a delivery service and is hence one of the key articles in this study. The 
importance of pricing in digital platform companies is emphasized by many scholars. As 
(Kung & Zhong, 2017), in their paper “The optimal pricing strategy for two-sided platform 
delivery in the sharing economy” state, pricing is a profound decision that all profit 
seeking entities face inevitably (Kung & Zhong, 2017). 
(Bardey et al., 2014) studied in their paper, “Competition in Two-Sided Markets with 
Common Network Externalities” the effect of different types of network externalities to 
platform pricing. They clarify the value drivers for prices and how price changes on one 
side of the platform affect the other side even to a great extent. Their main input is to 
explain the true effects that platform externalities can have on platform profits and 
platform pricing.  
 
2.2.3 Model by Hagiu (2009)  
Hagiu’s (2009) paper “Two-Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing Structures” 
examines platforms’ pricing structures. According to the author the main contribution 
compared to other papers is that it takes into account platform user’s desire for product 
variety and consumer’s power of choice among competing products. “The paper provides a 
new modelling framework to analyze two-sided platforms connecting producers and 
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consumers. In contrast to the existing literature, indirect network effects are determined 
endogenously, through consumers’ taste for variety” (Hagiu, 2009). 
Hagiu (2009) develops a mathematical model that evaluates optimal pricing, through 
the elasticity of consumers demand for variety. The first part of his analysis concerns 
platforms in a monopoly position. The second part extends the basic model to competitive 
platforms and monopoly platforms. This is an additional pricing strategy component. As he 
describes in his study, the competitive platform model is an extension to his basic model. 
The model for competing platforms is based on the intensity of demand for product variety 
from consumer side. Hagiu wants to show in his paper that, “consumer demand for product 
variety is a key factor determining the optimal pricing structures” (Hagiu, 2009). 
The study states that the more there is demand for product variety from consumers 
and/or, producers have power over consumers, the less effective a platform’s price 
reducing tactics for the consumer side are, in a competitive landscape. This leads into a 
smaller consumer price decrease. The author concludes that the effect of this, is that a 
platform’s optimal pricing strategy for a situation when producers compete with each 
other, is to focus on charging more from consumer side rather than the producer side 
(Hagiu, 2009). 
He summarizes the state of the research on this area, prior to his publication as 
“focused on the effects of the relative magnitudes of indirect network externalities, demand 
elasticities and coordination (chicken-and-egg) issues on platform pricing structures” 
(Hagiu, 2009). Furthermore he adds that, “platform competition creates counterintuitive 
pricing effects, which have not been identified up to now.” (Hagiu, 2009). He argues that 
earlier the reason behind lowering prices has been due to indirect benefits, when there are 
more consumers on one side, and they attract more people to the platform from other sides 
as well. In addition to this he states that, prior to his study, literature has not considered 
another reason for cutting prices in order to undercut a rival platform.  
From the two models that Hagiu (2009) presents, the more interesting one for this 
study is the duopoly model. Even though the case company operates in a market where 
there are more than few companies competing, the duopoly model is the closest one to the 
actual situation. There are situations where the case company’s service has a monopoly in 
some cities, but the majority of the time there is either direct or indirect competition.  
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2.2.4 Platform pricing according to Eisenmann et al. 
In their paper, Eisenmann et al. (2006) explore the strategies for two-sided markets. They 
pinpoint three challenges that successful platform company managers should consider; 1. 
Pricing the platform, 2. Winner-take-all dynamics and 3. The threat of envelopment. The 
authors credit pricing being the most important one. Closely related to pricing is their 
comment on how platforms create value. They argue that traditional companies only have 
cost on the left side of the value chain and revenue on the right side, but platform 
companies can have cost and revenue both to the left and right side of the value chain. 
Based on this, they go further to describe the dynamics of pricing decisions in platforms. 
As platform companies can draw value from both sides, usually one side of the platform is 
subsidized more than the other, but the problematic question is for how much and for how 
long (Eisenmann et al., 2006).  
For pricing a platform the study concludes that, when making a pricing decision, a 
platform company must take into account, “the impact on the other side’s growth and 
willingness to pay” (Eisenmann et al., 2006). The other side here means another participant 
group in a platform. This means that the pricing decisions are always dependent of each 
other in platform companies. This leads to that the price elasticity of demand, subsidizing 
decisions and margins become important.  
Platform companies, according to the study, experience, “increasing returns to scale” 
(Eisenmann et al., 2006) as platform users tend to pay more for access, the bigger the user 
base is. This they say, is usually not the case in traditional manufacturing and services 
businesses. They state that in traditional businesses growth eventually will lead into 
diminishing returns, as customer acquisition becomes harder. This fact of increasing 
returns through growth, leads into fierce competition in platform economy, states the 
article, and this creates the nature of platform markets, where winner take-all propensity 
sets its foot in (Eisenmann et al., 2006). 
2.2.5 The role of price 
Pricing decisions are decisions with underlying assumptions, expectations and informative 
value included in them. Price is set to define a value. However, this value is the opinion of 
the seller of a product’s or service’s value. Sometimes or even more often, the seller and 
the buyer does not share the same view on the price point for a good or a service. What 
happens then? The buyer can ask for a lower price and if this is not possible, the buyer 
does not have any other option than not to buy the good. He will look for similar products 
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with a lower price. Here comes into play one of the very basic characteristic of pricing 
decisions, price justification. If a company or a price setter can justify its pricing, the buyer 
is more likely to understand it and agree on the price point. This logic is especially true and 
in the core of the case company’s pricing model. They base their pricing to information 
and opinion collection from all of their platform participant groups to have strong support 
for their price and thus justify their price points.   
 
2.2.6 Platforms’ role as disruptors  
Van Alstyne et al. (2016) present and interesting statement in their paper, “Pipelines, 
Platforms and the New Rules of Strategy”. They present that, “When a platform enters the 
market of a pure pipeline business, the platform virtually always wins.” (Van Alstyne et 
al., 2016). This statement might need some further investigation, as I cannot completely 
agree with it. Because of the fact that platforms are hard to build, the statement does not, 
on my opinion, take this enough into account. It is true that with the examples we can see 
around us from successful platform companies such as. Amazon and Google, it is tempting 
to think that platforms would always do well and grab big market shares from traditional 
operators. The truth of matter is however that for every Amazon and Google, there are 
many failed attempts along the way. That is pretty safe to say. The quote could be 
rephrased to, “When a platform enters the market of a pure pipeline business, it has great 
potential to disrupt the existing market conditions, if it manages to be successful.”  
From the research presented in this study, the consensus seems to be that building a 
platform company is more complicated and harder to build than a traditional company 
(Eisenmann et al., 2006). This statement kind of contradicts with the above statement, 
saying that platforms will virtually always win in traditional markets. This is subject to 
platform’s success, which is quite hard to attain.   
Pricing mechanisms are a crucial part of building a platform. According to 
Armstrong (2006) there are mainly three types of pricing structures that are effectively 
used in modern digital era platforms. These are; subscription based pricing, also called 
membership or fixed-fee pricing (a lump sum is charged for the access and usage of a 
service), usage-based pricing, also called pay-as-you-go or per-transaction fee, and cross 
subsidization (when one side’s fee is used to completely cover another side’s cost) 
(Armstrong, 2006). Studying pricing structures in platforms is beneficial, because a 
platform company needs to assess their business model and think whether charging for the 
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access to the platform (Spotify’s freemium model) or the usage (Airbnb an Uber) will be 
more suitable for it.  
2.2.7 Utility in pricing 
Weyl (2010) presents in his paper, “A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms” a pricing 
theory for a platform’s participation rates. He approaches pricing through user utility and 
his formula is useful to be presented here. In his model he measures the amount a single 
platform participant derives as utility from a platform. !!ℒ	  is the utility that platform 
participant i derives from platform side ℒ. According to Weyl (2010) the utility is given by  
       !!ℒ	 =	%!ℒ + '!ℒ($ −	*ℒ(($)   (1) 
 
where NJ is the number of users participating on side -. *ℒ((%	) is the cost (or payment) 
for the access to the platform, conditional on a given the size of the platform on side  -. 
Here, %!ℒ is the inherent membership benefit or cost that a user derives from the platform, 
if there are no users on other side of the platform. The term '!& is either, an interaction 
benefit or cost of participation that each user derives, for every user that participates on the 
other side, with the conditionality of a given size of side -. To understand how this model 
functions, we can look at the example that the author provides:  This function is used to 
measure the participation rule at a certain price point. Weyl (2010) clarifies that once the 
tariff is set, the decision for a platform user i from side A to participate, is conditional. The 
conditionally is given by 
 %!' +	'!'(ℬ >	*'((ℬ)    (2) 
 
where %!'  is the membership benefit for user i from side A. '!'(ℬ  is the interaction 
benefit or cost of participation to user i on side A, conditional to a given size of side B. The 
term *'((ℬ)is the price set by the platform (the independent nature of i restricts price 
discrimination), and tells how much users must pay (or how much they will be paid) 
conditional on a given size of the platform on side B. In this model, when assessing the 
participation price level for side A, it is assumed that there will be participants on side B. 
In real life these two decisions are dependent on each other. As the authors mention, there 
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might a multiple of equilibrium price points and distribution of user preferences. The 
optimal pricing for a single price point in platform side ℒ is given by  
       *ℒ =					 /ℒ + 0($ 									− 												'$($ 	  (3) 
    Marginal private cost     marginal external benefit 
 
where *ℒ is optimal price for platform side ℒ. /ℒ is membership cost on side ℒ. 0($ is the 
interaction cost on side -. Together they are marginal private cost. The term '$($ is an 
interaction benefit or cost of participation to each user, conditional to a given size of side -.  According to this equation the optimal price will be the costs from two sides of the 
platform added and subtracted by the amount of marginal external benefit. The takeaway 
from this equation is probably more valuable for my study than the equation itself. Weyl 
(2010) states his reasoning for the correct price point for a certain user at a certain platform 
side, “the price of an activity should equal its private cost less any external benefits.” 
(Weyl, 2010). He clarifies that external benefits and thus the last term in the above 
equation (3) is the key difference in platform company and traditional company pricing.  
(Weyl, 2010). The author reflects the role of marginal external benefit, “because network 
effects are external to individual decisions, price should diverge from cost. Thus positive 
network effects should be subsidized and negative ones taxed.”  (Weyl, 2010). 
The example that the author provides, helps to understand the model better. 
According to the model, the newspaper readers should be subsidized below the cost of 
producing the news by the value the newsreaders bring to advertisers. This means that to 
calculate the optimal pricing for side A one should know the production cost of side B (the 
newspaper) and the value that side A brings to advertisers to calculate the subsidization 
amount for side A.  The model states also that advertisers (the value drawing side) have to 
be taxed, above the cost of their input to the platform, by the amount the other users 
“dislike” their input. This means that advertisers are taxed above the cost of producing the 
advertisements by the amount side A dislikes these advertisements.   
 
2.2.8 Implementing Weyl’s (2010) model to the case company 
 
To implement Weyl’s (2010) pricing model to the case company is a bit more complicated. 
First, Weyl (2010) defines in his example the newsreaders as the value adding side, 
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because they bring value to advertisers and advertisers the value drawing side. In the case 
of advertisers, the case is pretty straightforward but in the case of newsreaders it is a 
tempting thought to think that they also draw some value from reading the newspaper, 
otherwise they would not pay for it. Weyl does not state this explicitly in his study, he only 
speaks about the newsreaders value they bring to advertisers. I am not sure if a platform 
can be simultaneously a value drawing and a value adding side. The assumption I will 
make, is that a platform group must be either or.  
Following the logic by the Weyl (2010) model, the value adding side in the case 
company are the consumers (side A). This means that the merchants (side B) and the 
chauffeurs (side C) would be the value drawing sides. The same double role can be seen in 
the case company for the consumers as in Weyl’s model as the consumers are also the 
value-drawing side. According to Weyl’s (2010) model the value adding side should be 
subsidized and the value drawing side charged. If the consumers are the value adding side, 
they should be subsidized according to the model. This is true in the case company as the 
consumers are subsidized the most in the case company, with e.g. free delivery fees. This 
means that the two value drawing sides in the case company should be taxed. The 
merchants are taxed but the chauffeurs are paid. Could this mean that chauffeurs are 
drawing value from the platform? The variable costs for the platform are the chauffeurs 
that transport the goods from merchants to the consumers. In the case company there are 
no advertisers as in Weyl’s model. In the case company the “dislike” that Weyl uses, can 
be thought of as the cost of transportation. The dislike is hence consumers’ dislike to the 
cost of transportation.  
In the author’s example he uses newspaper as the platform. In the case company, 
since ordering the products through the platform is the same as acquiring them from the 
vendors directly, the value for side A (consumers), comes in the form of the delivery. In 
this sense the consumers should be subsidized product below the cost of producing the 
service, by the amount the side A creates value to side C (chauffeurs) I will calculate these 
price points for the case company from the data they have provided and provide the results 
at the end of this study.  
To know the amount of “dislike” from side A to side C (chauffeurs) should lead to 
correct pricing according to Weyl’s (2010) model. Interesting enough, the case company 
has a very unique method of figuring out this amount as will be shown in the chapter 3 of 
this study. The case company does this, by asking the participant of side A, their price 
sensitivity for the service of platform side C. According to the standard Pigouvian pricing 
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rule in the study, the pricing for side B should be the private cost of producing the goods 
less any external benefit, i.e. the value side B brings to other platform sides. This would 
yield a simple equation of  
 *% = /% − 	%/   (4) 
 
where PB is the price side B participants, CB is the cost of producing the service on side B 
and BC is the external benefit. The problem for the case company in this situation is that 
they don’t know the cost of production for side B. They can guess it, but they don’t know 
the exact amounts of manufacturing costs of the goods provided by the merchants. Also, 
the external benefit that the side B brings to the platform is hard to define. Later on, in the 
study I will calculate the optimal pricing for the case company’s side A. 
Weyl’s (2010) study, is set to examine, the implications of, “different sources of user 
heterogeneity” (Weyl, 2010). The user heterogeneity consists of interaction and 
membership values in this context. For this study, the most interesting and relevant part is 
to evaluate the utility, meaning the value that a single platform user can derive from the 
platform. This can then be further utilized in pricing decisions.  
 
 Platform value creation  
According to Schiff (2011), “Two-sided platforms create value by bringing together two 
distinct consumer groups and enabling some kind of interaction or transaction between the 
two sides” (Schiff, 2011). To understand platform pricing, it is needed to understand how 
platforms and digital platforms create value. Platforms in today’s economy, “comprise a 
large and rapidly growing share of the global economy” (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van 
Alstyne, 2011). As platforms exist in nearly every market in today’s business world, their 
value creation is a key point in understanding them thoroughly. Digital platforms, “use 
digital technology to create self-sustaining positive-feedback loops” (Cusumano et al., 
2020). This rich culture of communication is the basis of potential value creation to each 
new platform participant (Cusumano et al., 2020).  
Platforms create value by pooling, legalizing and facilitating interaction among its 
participant groups (Hagiu, 2014). Furthermore, “the value of platform access to each side 
is higher, the more members are present on the other side.”(Hagiu, 2014). This is what 
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Rochet and Tirole (2006) have also stated in their study, “Two sided markets: progress 
report”. 
According to Hagiu (2014), “Successful MSPs create enormous value by reducing 
search costs or transaction costs (or both) for participants” (Hagiu, 2014). This is not only 
an answer to how platforms create value, but also an answer to why platform companies 
exist in the first place. Uber, Amazon, Facebook, Youtube, Ebay and Android are all 
famous platforms and also digital platforms. Digital platforms are “online businesses that 
facilitate commercial interactions between at least two different groups” (Series, 2018). A 
simplified definition could be that digital platforms are platform companies that utilize 
internet in their business model to at least to a certain extent. In platform value creation, 
efficiency is a key term and the use of internet either enables or fortifies this. For digital 
platforms internet has enabled their whole business model and thus value creation. For 
non-digital platform, internet has not changed their value creation as dramatically.   
   
 Platform Profitability 
A platform’s journey to profitability starts often from being clearly unprofitable. In order 
to become profitable, the platforms usually need to increase their prices after the growth 
phase. Price increases can happen in a couple of ways in platforms. First, there are 
freemium models, where the service is available for free and for a premium (chargeable) 
option, full amount upfront payment or slowly raising prices as the platform’s user base 
grows enough. The challenge in the first option is how to convince customers already 
using the service for free start paying for the same service. This is a very delicate moment 
in the platform’s life. The second option is quite forward, but the usage of this pricing 
model requires a very established service and relatively little alternatives for the service 
e.g. operating systems. The last option is probably the most common alongside with the 
first option. Raisin prices after a critical mass is reached is a valid and common strategy for 
platforms seeking profitability.  
Once users experience high enough value from the platform’s service and want to 
use it advertisement free or to get new features, they are willing to start paying for it. This 
phase in platforms needs to be also considered in the context of competitive landscape. If a 
platform starts implementing fees for the usage, it takes a risk, that users will change to 
another, similar, not necessarily as good, but a cheaper platform. This is why pricing 
strategy has to be always considered in the context of competitive landscape. For platforms 
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that do not experience that much competition, the correct pricing needs to be reflected to 
other substituting services, not necessarily platforms.  
Platforms carry involuntarily a structural risk unique to their business model. This 
matter needs to be considered in pricing. One company representative pointed out to me, in 
a casual conversation about platform pricing that some users might use the platform only 
for a couple times, before striking a deal directly with the service provider outside of the 
platform. He mentioned that, this can happen especially with transportation platforms, such 
as Uber and Bolt, and with accommodation platforms, e.g. booking.com. (Bergmann, 
2020). I think that this is a valid point, that needs to be considered in platform pricing 
strategy. The main aspects to consider are the amount of repetitive use of the service (high 
repetitiveness correlates with the likelihood of cutting out the platform) and the possibility 
to be cut out as the “middle” man. Credit cards and gaming platforms provide a good 
example of platforms, that are very hard to be left out as a facilitator between the seller and 
buyer side.  
Hagiu (2009) argues in his study that the more there are platform participants on 
each side of the platform, the more valuable the access to the platform becomes. This 
means that as users’ utility increase and the platform grow, the platform operators are able 
to charge more for the access or use of the platform. This comment is in line with the 
utility model I presented in chapter 2.2.1. with increasing utility from the initial point of 
purchase in platform companies. Furthermore, Hagiu (2009) explains that, “a critical 
problem for platforms is to choose how much to charge each side for access (or 
membership in the language of Rochet and Tirole, 2006) in order to maximize profits” 
(Hagiu, 2009). This same challenge was addressed by the case company’s representative. 
The interviewee concluded that in the early phases of the case company’s service, they 
emphasize growth over profit maximization and for the question of for how long, the 
company representative provided a clear answer, “in the early stages of the service, there 
can be a situation of low growth, this means that chauffeur margins are quite high and thus 
our efficiency is poor, but if that market grows ten folded and efficiency doubles, we 
simply lower the chauffeur fees.” (Steven, 2020b). In this example the duration of 
subsidization is tied to growth numbers.  
In the case company’s framework, when a new location is launched and if there is no 
direct competition, pricing becomes even more challenging according to the interviewee.  
In these types of situations, they use industry benchmarking. This means comparing their 
planned prices to a relevant industry, not necessarily a direct competitor. In their case it 
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can mean local taxi operators or other low paying jobs, such as cashiers at McDonald’s 
(Steven, 2020). This will give them a “ballpark” figure and make the price prediction 
easier. The interviewee calls this pricing technique “sanity checking”. This pricing tactic is 
used for the new locations of the service that do not have direct competitors (Steven, 
2019b). 
2.4.1 The role of information in pricing  
Asymmetric information in pricing between sellers and buyers means an uneven 
distribution of information usually to the favor of the seller side. They simply know more 
about a product’s or service’s true value. However, perceived utility is another thing and it 
can be a significant value driver for the buyer side. Perceived utility can have considerable 
deviation from the objective utility of a product or service. In the long run, the roles of 
asymmetric information might change. If for example a pioneering company sets a price 
with an unnecessary large margin, and similar products emerge with a lower price, 
consumers can feel betrayed by the first mover company and choose to use other providers 
because of too aggressive pricing tactics. Of course, there can be a situation where the 
seller does not know the exact price for its product or service, but as a market matures, the 
laws of demand and supply will modify the prices eventually on a level that are agreed by 
most of the counterparties.  
Today’s data-rich world can introduce new possibilities to use more complicated and 
sophisticated pricing models, as more and more relevant data will be available. In this 
context, the findings from the case company are quite surprising but also impressive. 
Despite all the data available and complex mathematical models, their robust but quite 
accurate pricing model relies on unstructured interviews, thus not utilizing large amounts 
of existing data nor mathematical price modeling. As pricing in platform context is more 
demanding than in traditional firms (Eisenmann et al., 2006) the correctness of price 
decisions plays an even more important role.   
 
 Flow of revenues and costs in digital platforms 
Below, in figure 4 is presented the pricing mechanics in platform companies. The main 
thing to understand about platform pricing is that any given platform has to make at least 
two pricing decisions, one for the buyer side of the platform and one for the seller side of 
the platform. These two prices need to be thought through and set before launching the 
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platform. Of course, prices can be changed later on but raising prices is usually received 
with negative feelings. A distinctive characteristic of these two prices, is that they have to 
be thought of and set simultaneously, as one side’s price will eventually affect the demand 
of the other side as well. It is important to remember that this is an illustration of the 
minimal situation. In figure 4, there is described a two-sided platform with only one price 
decision to each side of the platform. Often platforms need to consider more than just two 
prices.  
Platform’s costs are usually a fraction of the same type of pipeline company (Van 
Alstyne et al., 2016). Platform companies do not own the products or raw materials they 
sell, they simply provide a platform to exchange the goods and services. Platforms also 
facilitate the communication for third parties. Uber is one the biggest logistics companies, 
but their costs of equipment is quite different compared to e.g. airlines. Uber probably 
owns some cars for its staff etc. but its main business is not based on owning the 
transportation hardware but connecting the ride-providers and ride-seekers. 
 
Figure 4 Platform Pricing Structure 
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The figure shows the pricing decisions that a platform operator must make for its 
participating sides. These prices drive effectively the demand on from those platform sides.  
   
2.5.1 Pricing model by Armstrong 2006  
In his paper, “Competition in two-sided markets”, Armstrong (2006) examines three 
competitive scenarios for two-sided markets. He lists them as follows: a monopoly 
platform, a competing platform where platform participant groups do not participate in 
competing platforms and a model where one side of a platform joins all competing 
platforms. This situation he calls ‘competitive bottlenecks’.  
In his study he defines “three main factors that determine the structure of prices 
offered to the two groups.” (Armstrong, 2006). The two groups here mean platform 
participating groups. These three defining factors he states are, “relative size of cross-
group externalities; fixed fees or per-transaction charges; and single-homing or multi-
homing” (Armstrong, 2006). Armstrong explains in his study each of these price 
determining attributes and their role in competitive situations. However, he does not go 
through all the competitive situations in every attribute but explains one competitive 
situation when this pricing determinant has or does not have an effect to a certain extent.  
Although Armstrong (2006) provides examples of non-digital platforms in the 
beginning of his study, he does not explicitly mention that his models would be only 
applicable to non-digital platforms. The context of the models is rather tied to a certain 
type of competitive situation of a platform. The case company experiences the same issues 
presented in this paper. Their competitive situation is between the competing platforms and 
competitive bottlenecks. In his study, Armstrong (2006) provides qualitative matters for 
pricing tactics in platform companies but also builds a mathematical model. Armstrong’s 
model is thoroughly examined later on in the thesis.  
 
 Quantitative models  
2.6.1 Model by Kung & Zhong (2017) 
Kung & Zhong (2017) study in their paper “the optimal pricing strategy for two-sided 
platform delivery in the sharing economy” the optimal pricing strategy to maximize profits 
also by considering network externality.  These are membership-based pricing, transaction-
based pricing and cross-subsidization.  
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They find that,” When time-discounting of revenues is absent and consumers’ order 
frequency is insensitive to price, the three strategies are equivalent.” (Kung & Zhong, 
2017). They clarify that this means that all the strategies are, “equally good in 
incentivizing the players in this system” (Kung & Zhong, 2017).  All these pricing 
strategies will eventually, according to the authors, “result in the same number of 
consumers, shoppers, and platform profits.” (Kung & Zhong, 2017). The authors build a 
quantitative model based on Armstrong's (2006) model and use the qualitative 
characteristics provided by Armstrong (2006), but build mathematical models to optimize 
prices under each different pricing strategy that Armstrong suggests.  The case company 
uses cross-subsidization in a same manner as is suggested in the study of Kung & Zhong 
(2017). 
2.6.2 Model by Sun et al., 2019 
A study by Sun, Teunter, Babai, & Hua (2019) “Optimal pricing for ride-sourcing 
platforms” provides a good example of the evolution of a taxi company called Didi 
Chuxing. It is an online car hailing platform, such as Uber and Lyft. The study tells a story 
of how the company first started by connecting a ride-seeking customer to the first 
responding driver and then moved to a more intelligent and thus profitable business model, 
of connecting the ride-seeking customer to the nearest driver. The study summarizes that 
this way they could lower waiting times, and also charge higher prices, resulting to a 
bigger profit margin. Two pretty significant changes. The downside of this change, as the 
study points out, is that the drivers have complained the model being unfair, compared to 
the earlier model of first-to-respond. In addition the loss of freedom to choose one’s 
customers independently has been criticized, as the platform now does the connecting of 
drivers and passengers automatically (Sun et al., 2019). The study presents the pricing 
strategy differences of the two aforementioned connection models and the differences in 
profit between the two strategies. This model is researched in the context of a two-sided 
platform with a delivery service.  
The authors of this study point out an insight concerning digital platforms with a 
delivery service. They state that, “pricing is a more complex task for online car hailing 
platforms than for most other two-sided markets.” (Sun et al., 2019). The authors credit 
this to the fact that different locations of drivers and customers affect the waiting and 
driving times. This on the other hand affects, “the cost for customers and the profit for the 
drivers” (Sun et al., 2019). This is an interesting statement referring to the challenging 
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nature of pricing in ride-hailing platforms. The case company has a similar functionality in 
its platform, the need to connect drivers to merchants and customers. The case company 
has a third side to the platform in addition to the chauffeurs and consumers, but the 
similarities are still high between the case company’s model and Sun et al.’s (2019) model. 
The authors of the study claim that this connection decision is overlooked in other studies 
concerning the matter and thus their study will have more accurate and relevant results 
(Sun et al., 2019). 
 
  Network effects  
Network externality in platform context means the utility that a consumer receives based 
on the number of other people using the same product,  and especially on how many 
people “on the other side” of the platform might be using it (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). This 
basic theory of network effects is same across all types of platforms. A good example of 
network effects is a phone. A phone does not itself provide much value to its user, if there 
are no other people who also have one. This same logic applies to modern digital 
platforms; such as Airbnb and Uber, where the value that a consumer receives, is 
dependent on the amount of people on the other side of the platform. This is commonly 
referred to as cross side network effects. Network effect can also be negative, which means 
that an additional user on the platform decreases the value for current users. Network 
effects can be positive, negative, direct (same-side) or indirect (cross-side) network effects 
(Clements, 2004). Direct and indirect network effects mean the incremental value an 
additional user will have to existing users to either side of the platform. The number of 
users on platform sides as cross-side and same-side network effects, refer to the user 
growth within the same platform. Katz & Shapiro’s (1985) pioneering paper on the matter, 
lets a reader to familiarize with the topic more in depth.  
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3 Methodology of the thesis  
To understand how digital platforms, make crucial pricing decisions, a total of nine pricing 
models are presented in this study. Of these models eight are from academic literature and 
one from the case company. The approach of this study is chosen to able to present a 
pricing model from real life and compare it to pricing model found from academic 
literature. The models presented in academic literature rarely have a real-life application 
mentioned. This study is in contrast to this, as it is able to present a pricing model in full 
and in detail with a real-life application.  
 
 Research approach and design 
Bengtsson (2016) describes the starting point for any academic study the following way, 
“In all research, it is essential to begin by clarifying what the researcher wants to find out, 
from whom and how” (Bengtsson, 2016). The topic was first clear to me, the pricing 
models in digital platforms. Next, I acquired the case company. As the case company was 
a delivery platform that narrowed the scope of the study. From the case company, I wanted 
to learn how they price their service. The people that I wanted to approach were of course 
knowledgeable with their pricing procedure.  
The method for the study is a case study method. This choice is supported by Zainal 
(2007), “Case study method enables a researcher to closely examine the data within a 
specific context.” (Zainal, 2007). The context in this study is very important. Zainal further 
explains the core approach of case study method, “Case studies, in their true essence, 
explore and investigate contemporary real-life phenomenon through detailed contextual 
analysis of a limited number of events or conditions, and their relationships” (Zainal, 
2007). 
Between inductive and deductive methods, this study is more of an inductive one and 
according to the definition by Zainal (2007)6 a descriptive study. According to Bengtsson, 
(2016), “Inductive reasoning is the process of developing conclusions from collected data 
by weaving together new information into theories” (Bengtsson, 2016). This describes the 
methodology of this study quite accurately. The findings from the empiria are presented, 
 
6 “descriptive case studies set to describe the natural phenomena which occur within the 
data in question” (Zainal, 2007) 
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evaluated and compared to academic literature. To build a theory from the empiria would 
require more interviews and possibly support from another case study. To build a theory 
based on the empiria and the academic findings could be possible, but not solely on the 
empirical part. 
The findings from the data collection in the case company were documented and 
analyzed. One of the study goals is to explore a case company’s pricing model. For this, 
the interview-based method was the most suitable. The case company was chosen because 
of its fit for the research scope. Only one case company was chosen based on the advice of 
the thesis supervisor. The contribution of the study is to present pricing models found from 
academic literature and describe in detail the case company’s equivalent. Platform 
entrepreneurs can use this study for the purposes of comparing pricing models, or to 
evaluate a suitable pricing model for their platform. The amount of data received from the 
case company about their pricing process, contributes a great deal to the quality of this 
study. 
 The data collection 
3.2.1 Interviews 
The empirical part consists of six semi-structured interviews, which were recorded and 
analyzed. In three other occasions information was collected with email. The interviews 
were done in Finnish language. The purpose of the interviews was to collect data to 
understand how the case company does their pricing decisions. This includes their pricing 
model, tools, people and different steps in the pricing process.  The first two interviews 
were transcribed to written format. The other four interviews were analyzed directly from 
the recordings, as the most complex information was gathered in the first two interviews.  
 
3.2.2 Questions planning 
For the first interview, the questions were planned and written before-hand and send to the 
interviewee. The nature of the first interview was to learn about the aspects that play the 
most important role in the company’s pricing and also aimed to grasp an understanding of 
the big picture concerning the pricing process at the case company. In regard to questions 
planning in other occasions, only for the second interview, did I send the questions before-
hand. In other occasions, I planned the questions but did not send them beforehand to the 
interviewee. During the interviews all planned questions were asked and responded. 
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However, there was also room for additional questions and some extempore discussions on 
important relative issues in the interviews. In the first two interviews the questioning 
structure was from general to more detailed. In other occasions, there was no specific 
structure for the questions. All the interviews were recorded and then analyzed. Four of the 
interviews were done at the company office and two via phone.  
Table 1 Interview and data collection summary with case company 
 
 Validity and reliability of the study 
Zainal (2007) mentions triangulation as a suitable manner to increase a study’s validity 
when using only one case company. In the data collection I used three methods; in person 
interviews, phone interviews and emails. In regard to the informant at the case company, 
he is a senior employee with a vast understanding about the company’s pricing structure 
and process. He has been with the company almost from the beginning and was there when 
the first pricing decisions took place. 
Traditional approach to interview-based data gathering - interviewing until 
information saturation is reached through multiple interviewees - was not possible at the 
company. However, the interviewee was the most senior person of all the people 
knowledgeable with pricing.  The additional interviewees would have had lower seniority 
and breadth of scope on pricing-related questions. In the case of contradicting information 
from the interviewees, the answer of the most senior interviewee (the one interviewed for 
this study) would have had the most weight on it. All the interviews were recorded. The 
case company data was kept in one computer folder and in a cloud platform. This data 
cannot be provided to outside people due to high confidentiality of the data.  
The reliability of the study’s findings is subject to the interviewer’s possible bias, 
and data collection methods. The reliability of the empirical parts builds on the fact that 
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there was one topic, that was discussed in nine different occasions, to build as accurate as 
possible description of the phenomenon. There were no real incentives that would bias the 
interviewer, the incentive was to be as objective as possible, by this I mean there was no 
hypothesis tested that could have motivated for a result bias, as the study was completely 
descriptive. From the technical point of view, as all the interviews were recorded, it was 
easy to go back and evaluate a piece of information and the context it was given in.  In 
terms of the other pricing models presented in this study, the correct presentation and 
interpretation of these models have the biggest effect on the results validity. As there are 8 
models presented in the study, the reliability of the comparison results between case 
company’s model and the other models, should be on a good level.   
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4 Case Company  
 Case company description 
The case company of this study is a European digital platform with a delivery service. It 
operates in more than 50 locations around Europe (spring 2020). The case company has 
three-sides and it delivers physical goods to private people and companies. Their business 
model is to deliver goods to consumers from selected merchants.  
The company has an application for all of its platform participant groups consumers, 
chauffeurs and merchants. The platform’s task is to facilitate the communication among 
the aforementioned participant groups. The platform’s task is also to choose the merchants, 
that it wants to be on its platform and to provide optional training to its chauffeurs (Steven, 
2019b). 
For the three distinctive platform participating groups, the platform operators need to 
make a total of 7 different pricing decisions every time they open a new location, they wish 
to operate in.  These seven pricing decisions are the following: One decision to merchants, 
four decisions to chauffeurs and two decisions to consumers (Steven, 2019). An interesting 
insight to the case company’s pricing strategy is that the price levels change from location 
to location. This creates the need to rethink the seven price points, every time a new 
location is opened. A new market means, in this context, a new city of operations. 
Locations vary in terms of their infrastructure, i.e. how time consuming it is to deliver 
goods in that specific area. Other location specific characteristics that the case company’s 
pricing model takes into account are user’s price sensitivity, average spending and 
competitive landscape. The crucial pricing decisions have to be made beforehand of 
opening the service. This requires from the platform’s pricing model quite a lot, as it has to 
produce seven different price points, which will impact not only the platform participant 
group in question, but also other users on the platform through cross-side network effects. 
Needless to say, is that the pricing model has a great effect on platform’s profitability.  
 
 The case company’s business model  
The case company connects three different platform participant groups and facilitates their 
communication with each other through the platform. The basic idea of the service is to 
provide a delivery service for existing products of third-party producers. Selecting the 
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producers with the most aspired products, is a key part of the case company’s business 
model and success. The product providers are selected based on their suitability to the 
platform and popularity among local consumers. For the consumers, there are two main 
reasons to use the platform: first, a consumer can pre-order the product from the shop and 
go pick it up or secondly, order the products delivered straight to the recipient’s location.  
The delivery feature is the company’s main business.  
To make profit out of this business model, the platform charges a commission from 
the goods providers, for the extra demand that they bring to them. The other revenue 
source are the consumers and businesses using the platform. These two platform 
participant groups represent the revenue side of the platform. The chauffeurs represent the 
cost side of the platform. The platform covers the cost of the drivers from the above-
mentioned revenue sources. These are the sources of revenue and cost for the case 
company. For the time being there is no revenue coming in from advertising (Steven, 
2019).  
4.2.1 Pricing decisions at the case company 
There are three different platform participant groups that need to be priced correctly, 
simultaneously and before a location is opened. The pricing decisions are always a 
dilemma between charging too high prices and leaving valuable profits on the table. 
Furthermore, changing a price includes a high risk of creating imbalance in the platform, 
as the price change of one side will affect the other sides’ demand through cross network 
externalities and thus the whole platform’s performance. In the case company, the total 
number of pricing decisions is relatively high because four out of the seven pricing 
decisions, are made to one platform participant group only, the chauffeurs. Here is listed 
all the pricing decision that the case company must do:  
 
1. For the product producers: commission  
2. For consumers: 1. Base fee for delivery and 2. distance fee for delivery 
3. For the chauffeurs: 1. hourly target level, 2. base fee for delivery (cost of 
delivery), 3. distance fee for delivery and 4. bonus system  
 
The consumer price is a combination of the cost of goods, (this price is determined by the 
merchants, not the platform) and the cost of delivery. For consumers the platform operators 
set two prices: the basic fee and the distance fee. Both of these pricing decisions concern 
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the cost of delivery. The basic fee is how much consumers are charged for the 
transportation at minimum and the distance fee is how much they are charged extra for 
longer delivery distances. These prices are different from the ones that are paid to the 
chauffeurs for the deliveries they make. The end price for consumers is a combination of 
the cost of goods and the cost of transportation. According to the interviewee, very often 
the price that the chauffeurs require is more than what the consumers are willing to pay for 
the delivery. In this case the case company must use the commission revenue it collects 
from merchants, to make up the difference in the logistics operations. The main revenue 
source for the case company is the commission they collect from the merchants. In a rare 
occasion, there is a possibility that consumers are willing to pay more for the delivery than 
what the chauffeurs ask to make the deliveries, in this case it will be an additional revenue 
stream. 
This clarification of the case company’s pricing decisions is a good example of the 
real-life situation and challenges that platforms face in their pricing logic. The key take-
away is that for the same output (deliveries) the case company needs to gather information 
from two different user groups; chauffeurs and consumers and set two prices. As 
mentioned, the price on the one side does not need to be hugely off balance, to affect the 
whole platform’s performance. Two different prices, for which data collection happens 
from two different target groups.  
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 Case company revenue model  
                     
Figure 5 Case company revenue logic 
 
Above is described the case company’s revenue streams and the allocation of the consumer 
price. The customer price describes the end user price that is then shared among service 
enablers. The first category is the revenue share paid to the producers. The price of the 
product is same at the case company’s platform as it is, if the producer would sell its 
products directly (Steven, 2019c). From this revenue, the case company charges a 
commission. This commission represents the main revenue stream of the case company.  
The price that the consumer pays is also used to pay for the cost of delivery. The 
delivery service enablers are a separate entity from the producers; thus, this cost is 
considered separately. As explained earlier, the case company figures out, through its 
pricing model, how much the deliverers need to get paid and respectively how much the 
consumer is willing to pay for the delivery. If the price that the chauffeurs require to be 
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paid is smaller than what the end consumer is willing to pay, the excess revenue is net 
margin from delivery. Alongside the commission from product producers these form the 
company’s net profit from operations. As mentioned earlier, the price that the chauffeurs 
need to be paid is often greater than what the consumers are willing to pay for the delivery. 
(Steven, 2019). 
 
Here are described the main revenue streams of the case company: 
 /123456	78985:8	 = /122;<<;15	=8985:8 + >8?;98=6	@88    (5) 
 /123456	A4=B;5 = /122;<<;15 + >8?;98=6	@88 − 01<C	1@	>8?;98=6	 (6) 
 
These two equations lead to the fact that the net revenue from deliveries is positive, if the 
delivery fee collected from consumers is greater than what the cost of delivery is paid to 
the chauffeurs.  
 58C	=8985:8	@=12	>8?;98=6	@88< > 0,      (7) 
       ;@ 01<C	1@	>8?;98=6	(0ℎ4:@@8:=	3=;08) <	'4<8	@88	@1=	>8?;98=6	(015<:28=	3=;08	@1=	>8?;98=6)		   (8) 
 
Cost of delivery is the cost or price that the chauffeurs require in order to be willing to 
participate to the case company’s platform and provide their logistics services.  
 
The delivery fee is the price that the consumers are willing to pay for the delivery. 
As it is often the case according to the interviewee, that the cost of delivery paid to the 
chauffeurs is greater than the delivery fee collected from consumers, the difference 
between the two prices, must be compensated with the commission revenue, received from 
the producers.  
 H@	01<C	1@	>8?;98=6 > 015<:28=	3=;08	@1=	>8?;98=6    (9) 
      Cℎ85,  
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 Platform participating groups 
As explained earlier, all types of platform companies have platform participating groups. 
These are distinctive groups of people with a similar interest towards the platform, e.g. 
chauffeurs in the Uber’s platform. The value that a platform creates, is that it facilitates the 
communication among its platform participating groups. For a company to be a platform, 
there needs to be at least two platform participant groups.   
In the case company, there are three different participating groups, consumers, 
chauffeurs and product producers. In order for the platform to function, i.e. carry out a 
single transaction through it, it needs to have all three platform participating groups present 
on the platform simultaneously and having them contribute their share of the service. Here 
are presented the case company’s participating groups with a short description about their 
operational functionality on the platform and a few words related to the pricing mechanics 
unique to each participating group and the platform participant group’s role in the revenue 
logic of the platform.  
 
Service users – consumers  
This user group represents the demand side on the platform and thus the revenue side as 
well. Service users are private people and companies, who in this industry are catered with 
various possibilities. The success of the case company’s platform ultimately depends on 
the acceptance and usage of this participant group. According to (Eisenmann et al., 2006) 
the most valuable side of the platform should be the most subsidized. In the case company 
they use subsidization for consumers to attract more demand on the platform. This is done 
for example by removing the delivery fee for a certain period. For this participating group 
the upside of using the case company’s service are time savings and convenience it brings. 
The platform offers them the possibility to have certain products delivered to home or any 
other location. The case company operates in pre-screened locations, in populated enough 
cities where the service can be of great benefit for busy people.  
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Chauffeurs  
This participant group represents the cost side on the platform. Chauffeurs are the enablers 
of the service. The number of chauffeurs available on the platform is subject to 
fluctuations. This platform participant group needs to be incentivized enough to guarantee 
their crucial presence during demand spikes. In addition to the low requirements of entry 
for this job, the case company has the possibility to offer its chauffeurs a safety net fee that 
acts as a backup, in case there are difficulties beyond the power of the chauffeurs to reach 
their target level of earnings level. Flexible working hours and an opportunity to be 
available for work whenever they like, also aim to make the job easy to access and 
desirable. The low requirements to become a chauffeur, also help attracting this platform 
participant group to the platform. To become a chauffeur, one needs to own either a car, 
scooter or a bike and a valid driver’s license. The case company provides optional training 
to the chauffeurs. In comparison to the goods providers, the platform is responsible of 
acquiring and training the chauffeurs. Besides fixed costs of the platform, chauffeurs 
represent the cost side of the platform.  
 
Goods providers  
For goods providers, the incentive to participate to the platform are the extra sales, that the 
platform brings, otherwise unattainable, according the case company. Goods providers for 
the platform are selected based on their popularity and suitability to the service. The 
products that are ordered through the platform are existing products of the merchants. 
Thus, the incentive to join the platform without any extra cost seems a good deal.  The 
merchants are charged a commission from the revenue that the platform generates for 
them. Another beneficial aspect to the merchants, is that they do not have to handle the 
payments for the orders, as they are done in the platform and then paid to the merchants by 
the platform company. In most markets the platform also takes care of the order receipts on 
behalf of the producers.  
This separation of platform participant groups is meant to help readers understand 
the dynamics of the case company’s platform. The participating groups have all their 
separate applications to the service, through which they communicate with each other and 
the platform operators. It is free for all the platform participating groups to join the 
platform and there are no costs related to being available on the platform, e.g. for the 
merchants. This means that the case company does not use subscription model, but a pay-
per-usage pricing model. 
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 The pricing logic for each participant group 
The case company has seven pricing decisions to decide upon. For goods providers the 
case company needs to determine the commission, that varies from location to location and 
even within one location. The first step in figuring out the correct commission for a certain 
location, the case company seeks for benchmark prices from competitors and analyze the 
competitive landscape of the location. Then they go see potential local product producers 
and ask for their opinion for a reasonable level of commission that they would be 
comfortable paying for from the additional sales generated by the platform should they join 
the platform. This type of unformal opinion seeking, is the company’s main tactic in 
figuring out the commission pricing, that they would receive in a certain location.   
For consumers, the price consists of the price of the goods and the price of 
transportation. If the consumer decides to order from the platform and pick up the goods 
by himself, then the cost is just the cost of goods. The cost of products is always same on 
the platform as it is at the merchants own catalogue (Steven, 2019). To determine the 
consumer prices, the case company uses competitive analysis and similar type interviewing 
as for the merchants.  
The price components for chauffeurs are hourly target level, base fee per delivery, 
distance fee per delivery and a bonus system. This means that the case company has to 
consider four different prices for this participant group. The first price to decide upon is 
how much a chauffeur should earn per each hour. Based on this number, the base fee and 
distance fee are designed so that at realistic operating efficiencies, the chauffeur earns the 
desired hourly income. If a chauffeur does not complete enough deliveries, the case 
company will top up the fees to match the desired hourly earnings. In some cases this is 
called the hourly guarantee remuneration, according to the case company. The purpose of 
this pricing component is to act as a safety net, in case there are technical difficulties or 
low efficiency in the market and the chauffeur is not able to operate at a desired level.  
This is an important number that the case company uses, when assessing the profitability 
of a certain location. If this price is set too high, it is hard to get the platform profitable as 
the platform will have over supply of chauffeurs and they are costly with the high price 
they are getting for just being online and if this price is too low there are not enough 
chauffeurs to deliver the requested orders from consumers. This is a good example of the 
problematic nature of price setting in platforms and digital platforms (Steven, 2019b). 
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The second price component that the case company considers for the chauffeurs is 
the per-delivery compensation, that the chauffeurs will receive once they make a delivery 
of any distance. This is an interesting price component and it comprises from the fee 
received from the end customer but usually partly as well from the merchant commission. 
Hence, this price that the chauffeurs receive is not cross subsidized from the consumer 
completely, as the interviewee mentioned. 
The third pricing decision is the per-distance fee which is a fixed amount after the 
distance covered by the basic fee has been surpassed. When I asked the case company 
interviewee about dynamic pricing, he said that there is not a price that would change in 
real time with the demand in their service and thus this, per kilometer pricing, is as close to 
dynamic pricing as it gets in the case company. Some might consider it dynamic pricing, 
but in this thesis, it is not considered as such.  
The final pricing decision for the chauffeurs, is the bonus system, which is an 
incentive system to make more deliveries at certain time periods with high demand. 
(Steven, 2019b) For this pricing component I do not have any further information, other 
than by delivering more, the chauffeurs will be rewarded more than the basic salary would 
be, from deliveries made. 
The basic logic behind the chauffeur pricing is that, to get enough riders on the 
platform, the case company uses a safety net, that guarantees a certain hourly income for 
the chauffeurs, if there are not enough deliveries to be made. In normal conditions, the 
base fee for delivery and the distance fee for delivery comprise the earnings of a chauffeur. 
(Steven, 2019a). The interviewee pointed out that, the safety net is more common in early 
phase locations and that in mature locations, the safety net is not needed that much 
anymore. He mentioned that, currently in most of the locations the chauffeurs earn their 
salary based solely on per-delivery and per-distance fees as well as the bonuses. This is of 
course the better situation for the case company as well, because these fees are always 
percentages from revenue and also mean higher earnings for the chauffeurs. The hourly 
guarantee fee will be paid whether there is revenue or not to the case company. For the 
case company, it is very important to understand the different price components of their 
service, before opening a certain location. 
 Pricing procedure for the service in a new location 
In this section I will describe in detail how the case company makes their pricing decisions 
for a new location that they consider as a potential market for their service. In the 
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beginning of the platform’s lifecycle, the price model and the price levels are set on a 
level, that emphasizes growth rather than profit maximization (Steven, 2019). The 
interviewee from the case company provided also confirmation on the importance of 
pricing before the service opens for public, “pricing is just something that you need to get 
right in the first place.” (Steven, 2018). Price the service too high, and the platform never 
takes off due to lack of users and price it too low and the service level is poor, profits are 
lost, and the future of the platform is risked. 
4.6.1 Competitive landscape and benchmarking  
The first step in the case company’s pricing procedure is a competitive analysis of current 
local, global and direct competitors in the desired market. This screening helps the case 
company get information on current price points, but also to understand their strategic 
goals for pricing. This is related to targeting locations where there are already similar 
services available and use their prices as a benchmark for their own pricing process.  
The case company interviewee said, that they utilize a lot of competition 
benchmarking to get ballpark figures for their pricing whenever this is possible. Also 
benchmarking to the general price level of transportation is something that they utilize for 
the starting place of their pricing.  This means that they can check for example local taxi 
companies’ prices for reference points. They also benchmark their prices to other low-
paying jobs in the locations.  
 
4.6.2 Pre-screen phase 
In the pre-screen phase, a memorandum is conducted about the suitability of a location for 
the service to be opened. This is done by the case company’s own employees. In this phase 
they look at a location’s; population, habitant density, average spending, average income, 
city infrastructure and other matters that will help them assess the goodness of a location. 
The case company might utilize legal consulting, but other than that, no outside reports are 
used for this phase.  
4.6.3 Travel to location – further data collection  
Once the pre-screen analysis is done and accepted, there is either a decision to travel to the 
location for further investigation or a rejection of the location. If the pre-screen phase 
indicates that a location is worth further investigation, a small team of two to three people 
is then sent to the location for approximately 5 to 7 business days to further examine the 
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suitability of a location for opening the service. This is a very important part of the analysis 
and also one of the most interesting findings of this study.  
Once the small team arrives to a location, they will start conducting interviews with 
all the platform participant groups; goods providers, chauffeurs as well as end customers. 
From these discussions, which are usually very informal and even unplanned in nature, the 
case company collects opinions on correct price points for each participant group. They 
interview with several participants (around 15) from each group to form as educated as 
possible estimate of the correct price level. These opinions on the prices are gathered to an 
Excel cost-accounting model, which the location team updates as they receive more 
opinion to the prices from the interviews. In the model they have all the service-related in- 
and outputs. Once enough opinions are gathered from all the user groups, this model is 
used to calculate, whether a certain location makes economically sense to be opened.  
The interviewee points out that they consider the local people as experts on the issue 
of correct price levels for the service. At first, this was quite unexpected, as I had expected 
a more analytical or formal method to price a platforms service. However, this method 
makes a lot of sense, as local people can usually say whether a certain consumer price is 
reasonable or not for a service that is not too complicated to understand. By gathering 
enough of these opinions, as the case company does, a confidence starts to build that a 
certain price level is correct for the service at a certain location.  
4.6.4 Cost-accounting Excel tool in pricing 
The Excel spreadsheet that the case company uses in its pricing procedure, has all the 
relevant inputs and outputs relevant to pricing. The opinions asked from different 
participant groups are recorded there and updated throughout the data collection process as 
new opinions are received.  
4.6.5 Analysis of case company’s pricing method 
The method described above of collecting and gathering crucial price-setting information 
is the biggest finding of this study. The method itself is not anything extra-ordinary, but to 
use unstructured and unplanned interviews to price a platform’s service, was a finding that 
is unique in the context of this study’s research. The utilization of local people as the 
experts is the true aha-moment here. I think the method is almost too obvious to be 
considered valid, at first thought. The interviewee did not mention, whether the case 
company had considered any other pricing models during their existence. In regard to their 
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chose of method for pricing, he mentioned that, due to their service being very new, there 
are no outside experts that would know better their industry than themselves, meaning 
professional consultants for example.   
The interview process that the case company uses, can be described as informal and 
unstructured in terms of how the interviews are planned and agreed upon. The interviewee 
explained that the investigation team often goes to co-working spaces to interview 
potential users.   
The key take-away from this finding is that the true power lies on the simple method 
of using local people as the “real experts” on consumer prices on a service that they 
already are familiar with. In this sense the case company utilizes the power of the many or 
crowd sourcing as a method for gathering crucial information. I have encountered a similar 
type of method used for service innovation through interactive customer feedback, but as a 
method for price-setting this was a unique finding. At the end of the day it is an effective 
way of gathering relevant information from people most knowledgeable on the matter. 
When I asked from the interviewee, whether they use price analysis by outside firms, he 
pointed out that no outside analyst can really beat the expertise of a local person on this 
issue. These four phases described above are the main data collection methods and steps in 
the case company’s pricing procedure.  
 
 
 
Figure 6 Pricing process components of case company 
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 Detailed steps in the pricing procedure 
In this section I present and describe all the steps that are included in the pricing process of 
the case company. In the previous chapter, the most important and defining steps were 
described. To get a complete understanding about their price setting procedure, it is good 
to go through all of them. A tool that the company uses as a part of the pricing process, not 
presented in the previous chapter, is the greenlight memo that the team that travels to a 
promising location, creates. The people involved in pricing, are the case company’s own 
workforce. They conduct the desktop analysis, travel to the locations, conduct the data 
collection and create the greenlight memo. The case company’s COO and executive board 
will review every greenlight memo and decide whether a certain location will be opened or 
not. If the service is decided to be opened at a certain location, the final touches for the 
prices are done with the help of the same local people used for the initial interviews, in the 
role of new employees of the company.  This is the final pricing adjustment before going 
live with the service.  
 
 
 
Figure 7 Steps of the  pricing process in the case company 
 
The figure 7 showcases the steps in the pricing process, in the case of a successful 
opening of a location. The pricing process can be ended after desktop analysis or after 
travel to location if the location is deemed unsuitable. This the company interviewee did 
not call part of pricing specifically. The first step, competitive landscape and 
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benchmarking, is usually continued to be assessed throughout the pricing process. He 
added that usually pricing process is not started if there is no decision to open a location. 
(Steven, 2019).  
 Data Sources for the pricing process 
Below is illustrated the four main components of the case company’s pricing process. 
After the desktop analysis is done and the first inputs to the cost-accounting table software 
are put in, starts the fine and unique part of data collection with interviews. As new 
information is gathered from the interviews the cost-accounting table is updated. This 
happens constantly and as an evolving process (Steven, 2019). The cost accounting model 
is an important tool that is updated constantly, and it keeps an up-to-date view on current 
price points. Four main data sources are:  
1. Competitive Analysis and Benchmarking 
2. Desktop Analysis for background info and robust analysis for profitability 
3. Interviews with target group participants 
4. Local employee knowledge 
 
The data collection for correct price points goes in chronological order from the 
above-mentioned sources. First there is a competitive analysis and benchmarking, which 
provides information on markets that already have a similar service in operation. This 
according to the case company interviewee are the most suitable locations for their service. 
Secondly is the desktop analysis which yields the first inputs to the cost-accounting model, 
with city population, spending, density etc. The third part is the unique and interesting part 
of data collection from local target group users. Finally, the knowledge from local 
employees of the company to the cost-accounting tool is gathered for final price 
adjustments. Gathering more and more information and updating the cost accounting 
model eventually leads into the final price points that the service will then be opened with. 
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Figure 8 Data Sources for pricing process 
 
If the desktop analysis indicates that a location has potential to be financially 
profitable, the case company proceeds to phase 3 of the data collection process. This phase 
takes up to, on average 6 to 7 working days per location. The information from the steps 
1,2 and 3 are gathered to form the greenlight memo, which is then presented to the COO 
and executive board of the company for revision and approval. The fourth phase happens 
only if the location is decided to be opened, but it is a demonstration of utilizing local 
people knowledge on correct price points.  
 
4.8.1 Pricing process tools and data utilization 
There are four different data collection steps, as explained in detail in the previous chapter. 
These steps are used for the first box below in figure 9. The tool that the case company 
uses for their pricing, is a cost accounting spreadsheet model presented in the second box 
off figure 9. It has all the inputs and outputs affecting the individual price points, signaling 
the profitability of a single location. The third box are the best estimates for the 7 prices 
that need to be set before opening a location.    
Cost 
accounting tool 
for inputs and 
outputs 
(financial 
reasoning)
1. Competitive 
landscape and 
price 
benchmarking
2. Desktop 
Analysis
3. Interviews 
with local 
target groups
4. Local 
employee 
opinions on 
price points
Greenlight 
memo 
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Figure 9 Pricing structure of the case company 
 
 Timeline for opening a new location  
Pricing decisions for the service in the case company happen in steps. For this matter, here 
are presented these steps with their respective durations. The purpose of this part is to let a 
reader to understand the time invested in the whole process, as well as per individual step. 
The pricing process is a sum of different steps done with different tools and methods. Here 
is described how time is allocated to each step in their pricing procedure and also the total 
time spent from the beginning of the process to the end.  
 
1. Step – Desktop analysis – Less than 1 month, usually a bunch of good candidate 
countries reviewed as a bunch, of which the most suitable ones are then cleared for 
the next phase.   
2. Step – Travel to location and planning and execution of memorandums and – 4 to 5 
weeks. 
3. Presentation of location specific greenlight memorandums to company COO and 
launch team. – 1 week. For locations needing bigger investments, extra 2 to 4 
weeks are required.  
4. Process of opening the new location, including recruitment of local team and 
setting up all the practicalities – 3 to 5 months.  
 
Data collection 
(interviewieving 
target groups)
Cost accounting 
with inputs and 
outputs (financial 
reasoning)
Correct price 
points for each 
platform 
participant group 
(total of 7 price 
points)
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From these steps, the most time is taken by the last step. However, at this is point the 
decision to open up a location is already done. Hence, for the pricing procedure and data 
collection before opening a location, the time span is roughly two to three months, after 
which the location is decided to be opened. If a location is deemed unsuitable after travel 
to the location the pricing process end there.  The interviewee added, that the final price 
adjustments may be done once a location is opened, with the help of group management 
and the local team. (Steven, 2020a) 
  Tools and methods that the case company uses for pricing 
The case company uses some analytical tools (desktop analysis phase and cost-accounting 
model in Excel), but most of all its pricing procedure relies on unstructured and even on 
unplanned “interviews” to gather relevant data from local people who are considered 
representatives of one of the three platform participant groups. This means that the case 
company’s employees travel to a location and interview all of its platform participating 
groups; 1. Consumers, 2. Chauffeurs and 3. Goods providers. From these platform 
participating groups, they ask about their opinion of how much they would be willing to 
pay or willing to receive from this type of service. From each interviewee the case 
company gets a relevant opinion about the price points which they record to the unit 
economics Excel sheet.  Once they have interviewed enough people, 15 to 20 people 
(Steven, 2020), and they feel that they have formed educated enough estimate of the price 
points for each participating group, they compare these numbers together with other 
information in the cost-analysis tool in Excel, to construct a view of a certain locations 
economic suitability. 
For the desktop analysis part, the case company utilizes public information to layout 
a basic profile for a profile. These include; number of inhabitants, average spending and 
population density. They also consider the logistical structure of the locations, in order to 
analyze the delivery service’s efficiency in that location. For the desktop part, the company 
does not use any highly sophisticated tools, outside reports nor company external 
workforce. For this, the interviewee pointed out that, they themselves are the biggest 
experts on this industry, and thus acquiring analysis from third parties does not make sense 
for them. The one software that my case company mentions using, is Microsoft Excel for 
the data collection part and analyzing the cost-related information.  
The main method of pricing as mentioned, are unstructured and unplanned 
interviews, with a targeting on expected target group representatives of the service. From 
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these interviews the most crucial data is collected, cumulated and compared to the earning 
logic tool. The interviews are where the case company extracts their most valuable 
information.  
4.10.1 Evidence on the pricing model’s performance  
In this chapter I will share data from the case company’s pricing forecasts, i.e. what the 
company’s pricing model forecasted for the service prices in a certain location, and what 
the actualized prices have been after months in operation. In the table below we can see the 
prediction for the average purchase for the service before opening the service compared to 
the realized sum.  
The purpose of this table is to provide evidence on the validity of the pricing method 
that the case company uses to predict correct price points. To demonstrate the accuracy of 
their model, I have calculated also the standard deviations for five operating locations of 
the service. From the calculations we can see that the differences between the forecasted 
average purchase and actualized ones are quite small and the average standard deviation 
among all these five locations is only 15,63. In addition to this, only in one of these five 
location the estimated average price was above the actualized price point. That leads us to 
think, that the model that the case company uses is tuned to be more conservative in its 
approach to rather underestimate the price points than overestimating.  
Table 2 Actual purchases vs. Forecasted purchases 
 
The forecasted prices and the actualized prices deviate from each other, because there can 
be price adjustments after a location is opened and the forecasted prices are average 
purchases, not fixed service prices.   
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4.10.2 Chicken and egg problem in the case company 
The interviewee pointed out that, the hardest part in opening a new location for the service, 
is in the beginning, when they have to estimate the consumer’s demand for the service and 
then attract enough, but not too many chauffeurs online to the platform. He adds that, 
especially in markets, where there are no similar services in operation, the beginning is 
especially challenging. For these situations the case company uses incentives. Using 
incentives is not an uncommon method in platform companies to drive the demand on each 
side of the platform. Once the case company has decided to start operating in a new 
location, they need chauffeurs to be available on the platform for deliveries. The safety net 
feature that the case company provides for its chauffeurs is a good example of an incentive 
system. This is especially true in the newer locations.  Eventually, when a market 
stabilizes, the safety net becomes redundant and the payments to the chauffeurs will follow 
a “market economy” type of structure, meaning that chauffeurs earn their target level with 
base and distance fee components.  
However, according to the interviewee, it can take several years until the demand is 
predictable enough for the market economy model to work, because the service usually 
keeps on growing which makes the prediction of demand hard for quite a long time after 
the opening. This on the other hand means that the case company predicts the demand, 
publishes the needed number of hours to the chauffeur platform and then the chauffeurs 
book the hours for themselves that they are willing to work on. If there is a situation of low 
efficiency in the markets and the chauffeurs cannot reach their target fee, the case company 
covers the difference between the set target level and realized remuneration. This can be 
seen as the main incentive that the case company uses to get the drivers online to the 
platform. Should a market be in a more mature state, the case company does not need to 
publish the hours anymore as chauffeurs know the demand spikes and come online at peak 
hours. 
For producers, there are no such price incentives or price components changing 
along the demand. Once a producer is chosen to be part of the platform’ service, a fixed 
commission is negotiated separately with each goods provider. For consumers there are 
incentives for longer periods. For them, the delivery fee might be removed for weeks or 
even months, to drive up the demand from that side (Steven, 2019c).  
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5 Model evaluations and comparisons  
 Analysis of the case company’s model  
As described in the earlier chapter, the case company relies heavily on unformal and 
unstructured means of collecting vital information, from which they will eventually create 
the price point opinions for all the necessary individual price points in their service. 
Compared to existing pricing models researched in this study, the case company’s pricing 
method is unique. No other study, presented in this thesis states a similar type of data 
collection method, informal interviews, as a vital source of pricing information. The 
models presented in other journal articles usually build a mathematical model, that will 
generate optimal price points for a platform. These types of models can be suitable for 
more generic markets with similar price elasticities of demand and more stable market 
conditions than the ones that the case company operates in. However, the real benefit of 
the case company’s pricing model is its robustness, ease of customizing and repeatability.  
It can generate prices for various market conditions and take into account multiple 
location-specific price opinions. The case company’s model goes from forking out a price 
range with competitive analysis and benchmarking towards more precise estimations, as 
opinions from different target group users cumulate and steer the price points towards 
more educated predictions. Naturally, there are still variance among locations, on the 
successfulness of the pricing strategy, even though the same model is applied to all new 
and existing locations. The proof about the pricing model’s correctness comes from the 
business. The case company has not yet (Spring 2020) been forced to close any of its 
locations due to poor performance. Also, the table presented in chapter 3.11. presents the 
actualized prices against the forecasted ones as an evidence on the pricing model’s 
performance. The average standard deviation also presented in the abovementioned table, 
fortifies the fact that, the case company’s pricing model does perform quite well in terms 
of predicting the correct price points for both market types, the ones with existing 
competition and the ones that there are no similar services already available.  
Another strength of the model is utilizing crowd sourcing and the real experts on 
local price points, the local people. In my thinking, it would be hard to achieve the same 
results with only mathematical models. Should the case company utilize mathematical 
models, the ones that use price elasticity of demand could be the most useful ones, for 
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predicting correct price points. Still it is hard to imagine that a mathematical model would 
be better than the pricing procedure of the case company from beginning to end.  
 
 Other Platform pricing models  
5.2.1 Kung & Zhong (2017) model  
Kung & Zhong (2017) compare in their study three basic pricing strategies; membership-
based pricing, transaction-based pricing, and cross-subsidization. They find out that,” all 
the three strategies result in the same numbers of shoppers, consumers, and profits in 
equilibrium”. This means that according to them, all the strategies have the, “same 
efficiency of incentivizing users to join”. (Kung & Zhong, 2017). In their study they: 
“construct a game-theoretic model featuring sharing economy and network externality to 
examine a grocery delivery platform’s two-sided pricing strategy” (Kung & Zhong, 2017). 
The study will eventually come up with optimal price levels under each strategy.  
However, should the consumer’s order frequency be, “affected by the per-transaction 
fee” (Kung & Zhong, 2017), as it is often the case in real life, the authors conclude that in 
this situation the membership-based fee would earn a platform the highest profits, because 
it collects the money up-front and maximizes, “the price-sensitive order frequency.”(Kung 
& Zhong, 2017). This is an interesting finding when thinking about the case company. The 
case company is not using membership-based pricing, but according to the results of Kung 
& Zhong, the case company would result in same level of profitability with fixed fee 
pricing for deliveries. As Kung & Zhong mention in their study, the common business 
model of platform delivery companies is transaction-based fee, although some of the 
players in the field have experimented with fixed-fees for the deliveries, e.g. Instacart7.  
5.2.2 The Armstrong (2006) model  
Below is the comparison of the pricing attributes that Armstrong (2006) presents in his 
paper to the case company’s context.  
 
 
 
 
7 https://www.instacart.com/help/section/360007797952 
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Relative size of cross-group externalities  
First relative size of cross-group externalities means the difference in value among the 
platform participant groups that they each bring to the platform and then its effect on 
platform’s pricing strategy. Armstrong’s main idea in this definition is that the price for 
one side of the platform is defined by that group’s benefit to the other side. If one platform 
participant group benefits more from the other platform participant group, then that side 
bringing in the most value is usually subsidized more heavily. This is because the platform 
needs this platform participant group more than the other or they are harder to get to join 
the platform.   
In the case company the logic is a bit more complicated. According to the 
interviewee a right selection of goods providers is the most important thing in their service, 
otherwise there is no demand. This means that goods providers would be the most valuable 
user group to the platform and thus should be subsidized the most. The user group that 
draws the most benefit from the platform on the other hand are the end users. According to 
the Armstrong’s model the platform participant group that brings in the most value to the 
platform is usually the most subsidized (example from night clubs, where women bring 
more value to the platform and thus are given more often free entrance.) In the case 
company, the only platform group that are effectively paid are the chauffeurs. Surprisingly, 
the all-important merchants are not paid, as they are charged a commission from the price 
of the goods sold, for their participation to the platform. This is an interesting dynamic as, 
according to the interviewee, the merchants are the single most important part of their 
platform. Without popular goods providers, there would be no customers and thus no need 
for the chauffeurs either. Even though the merchants bring value directly to consumers and 
indirectly to chauffeurs, as popular merchants mean more deliveries and thus earnings to 
chauffeurs, they are charged for their participation.   
 
Fixed fees vs. per-transaction fees 
The second platform characteristic affecting the pricing strategy according to Armstrong 
(2006) is whether a platform uses fixed fees or per-transaction charges. This is an 
important decision faced by all platform companies. This is probably the most common 
pricing decision that platform companies do. In his paper, Armstrong states that the 
differences between these two-pricing logics only matter when there are competing 
platforms around. In this situation, he suggests that the per-transaction fee should make a 
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platform more profitable. This is due to lessened platform participant externalities (the 
effect in value created by one participant on one side to the other side).  
In the case company, there are both of these pricing decisions applied. The 
merchants pay a commission, which is a fixed fee price and revenue to the case company. 
For chauffeurs, there is a fixed fee called guaranteed minimum remuneration per hour and 
then per-transaction payments, the base fee and distance fee. Also, the bonuses are per-
transaction. By this categorization I have to decide which pricing logic is used more often. 
It is a hard task as there are almost equal number of these in the case company, two fixed 
prices (merchant commissions and hourly guarantee for riders) and three per-transaction 
prices (per-delivery fee, per-kilometer fee and bonuses, which are not at least fixed.) For 
consumers the case company uses per transaction fee and the other price strategies are a 
mixture of fixed fees and per transaction fees.  
 
Multi-home or single home 
The third and final platform characteristic that defines the pricing structure according to 
Armstrong’s (2006) model, is whether the platform participant groups multi-home or 
single home. To be able to compare the case company to Armstrong’s (2006) model, we 
need to consider whether the case company participants multi-home, i.e. participate to 
several competing platforms or use mainly one. I asked about this subject from the 
interviewee and his answer provides some clearance on the topic: “many consumers 
probably use multiple delivery platforms, but exact information on this we do not have.” 
(Steven, 2019). As the interviewee has been in the case company for about 95% of its 
existence, I think his sense on the topic is a good guess. If the consumers, do multi-home, 
then this would suggest that the case company should use Armstrong’s competitive 
bottlenecks model. When talking about the other participant groups, chauffeurs and 
merchants, the case company interviewee clarifies the situation from their part the 
following: “When it comes to the merchants, my belief is that they also use multiple 
delivery platforms. In terms of the chauffeurs, it is a bit different story as it is hard for 
them to participate to many competing platforms at the same time, as the demand spikes 
are same in competing platforms, than in ours.” (Steven, 2019). 
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5.2.3 The optimal pricing for the case company using Weyl’s model 
In this section I will calculate the optimal amount of subsidization for the platform side A 
according to Weyl’s (2010) model. To calculate this, I use the average purchasing basket 
of the case company and the realized cost of delivery that was charged from platform 
participant group A (end customers). The side A should be, subsidized below the cost of 
providing the service by the value they bring to side C (Weyl, 2010).  
The value that side A brings to side C in terms of the delivery is calculated by 
dividing the average cost of delivery by the average purchase basket. The cost of 
producing the service to side A are the manufacturing costs of goods, added by the cost of 
delivery /I = /J + /K   (11) 
 
where CA is the cost of producing the service to side A, CG is the manufacturing costs of 
goods and CD the cost of delivery. According to the data from the case company the 
average cost of delivery is 11% from the average basket purchased on the platform8. The 
result is calculated from five different locations in Europe. In one of the locations the 
delivery fee was set to zero, thus affecting the average.  
The value of the average purchase basket from the same locations is 60. This number 
represents the cost of producing the goods in this context. With these figures, we can 
calculate the optimal amount of subsidization to side A. Then the optimal amount of 
subsidization S for side A is given by, LI = 60 ∗ 0,11   (12) LI = 	6,6	    (13) 
and the optimal price PA for side A is thus,  *I = 60 − 6,6   (14) = 53,4     (15) 
 
The average cost of delivery, i.e. value to platform side C is 11% and the optimal 
subsidization for side A, according to the model is 6,6. In the case company a common 
way to subsidize side A is by removing the delivery fee. The problem in this 
implementation is that I have used the average cost of delivery as the value that side A 
 
8 These calculations can be seen in Appendix A 
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brings to side C. It should be another number that there could be an evaluation of how well 
the model predicts price points. The fee that the chauffeurs require, i.e. the value they want 
to draw from the platform is often bigger than what the consumers are willing to pay for 
the delivery as is stated by the case company representative. This means that the side A’s 
“dislike” to side C’s service is greater than what the value they bring to side C is. 
Another option to calculate the same optimal amount of subsidization and price point 
would be to use industry knowledge. According to the industry knowledge in everyday 
consumer goods, a product with a selling price of 100 has the costs of raw materials of 25, 
meaning 25%.  The side A should be then subsidized below this cost by the amount they 
bring to side C.  service. The optimal subsidization is something that puts the side A’s 
participation price below this cost by the amount they bring to side C. This would yield  LI = 25 ∗ 0,11  (16) = 2,75    (17) 
and the optimal price point PA would then be,  *I = 25 − 2,75  (18) = 22,25   (19) 
 
As a conclusion, it can be said that the model by Weyl (2010) seems to work fairly 
well for this part of the case company’s price setting. The problem or risk with 
mathematical models in high-growth platform companies is that they might over optimize 
some details with the cost of not being robust enough for the fast-changing situations. I 
think that using a model, such as Weyl’s (2010) could be utilized in the more mature 
locations of the case company. The successfulness of the case company’s current pricing 
procedure is best supported by the evidence of its predictive accuracy showed in table 2 in 
section 3.10.1.  Based on this it is not advisable to change to current pricing model with the 
data collection method.   
5.2.4 Sun et al. model for digital platforms with a delivery service  
The study of Sun et al. (2019) focused on the customer and driver waiting and driving 
times. The cost side of their model provides another reference point to the case company.  
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Cost side of the Sun et al. (2019) model 
The total cost of e-hailing by Sun et al. (2019) is given by 
  /) = U + V	 ∙ 	 *!+ ,  (20) 
where /) is the total cost of e-hailing. U is the price for a ride and V is the waiting cost per 
time unit. Waiting time equals to ri/v. ri is the distance from driver i to the customer’s 
departure point.  V is  the average speed of driver per hour (Sun et al., 2019). 
 
“Platform’s optimal pricing strategy when selecting the first driver to respond” (Sun 
et al., 2019) 
 
          
Figure 10 “Maximum acceptable distance of customer and drivers as a function of ride price F” (Sun et al., 
2019) 
The case company does have waiting times. From the time the order is placed until 
the order is received. At the case company, the variance of delivery distances, is coped 
with charging additional costs for longer deliveries per an individual delivery. The waiting 
times for the consumers are controlled by encouraging people to utilize close-by producers, 
by charging extra for the distance. Also taste for product variety is quite high in the case 
company, thus, ensuring that a high enough number of different merchants are located 
within a reasonable ordering distance, is a key component of controlling waiting times but 
at the same time provide a high service level.   
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6 Results  
The goal of this study was to examine and present how digital platforms conduct pricing 
decisions. This was done by presenting eight academic pricing models and one model from 
a European digital platform. The research questions reflect the research agenda of this 
study. In this section, the research questions are answered with the evidence found from 
academic studies and the case company. The research questions were: 
How do digital platform companies with a delivery service determine correct price points 
for their service? 
Can a digital platform with a delivery service make accurate pricing decisions based on a 
qualitative model? 
 
Table 3 below summarizes the main functionalities of the pricing models studied for this 
thesis. A total of nine platform pricing models were presented in this study. Of them, six 
models were studied more in depth. From these six models, four were considered explicitly 
in the context of delivery platforms. Some of the models were given more attention than 
others, and the decision to implement Weyl’s model to the case company, was done based 
on the model’s applicability to the case company’s available attributes. 
For the pricing models studied in the context of delivery services, there seems to be a 
common nominator, the usage of mathematical modeling to determine the optimal price 
levels.  From the four models presented in this study for platforms with a delivery service, 
three use mathematical modeling to calculate the optimal pricing for delivery platforms. 
The model of the case company stands in clear difference to this, as it utilizes platform 
user-group interviews as its main source of data for price level decisions. The pricing 
models for delivery platforms found from academic research are somewhat similar to each 
other, as they utilize all mathematical formulas to calculate the optimal price levels for the 
platforms. They might measure different attributes, but the methodology is very similar.  
The pricing models presented and studied in this Thesis can be divided into two 
categories, based on their use of quantitative or qualitative methods. The qualitative 
models presented in this study are: Eisenmann et al. (2006), Hagiu (2009) & (2014), partly 
Armstrong (2006) and the case company’s model. Quantitative models are Kung & Zhong 
(2017), Riquelme et al. (2015),  Sun et al. (2019) and Weyl (2010). Not all the models 
studied in this thesis were studied in platform delivery context. The pricing models studied 
in the context of delivery platforms were: (Kung & Zhong, 2017; Riquelme et al., 2015; 
Results 66  
 
 
Sun et al., 2019) and the case company’s model. The pricing models studied in other 
industries were: (Armstrong, 2006; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Hagiu, 2009, 2014; Weyl, 
2010)  
Of the four pricing models for delivery platforms, two were studied in ride-sharing 
platforms; Riquelme et al. (2015) and Sun et al. (2019). The other two delivery models 
were studied in the context of delivery platforms with physical goods; The model by Kung 
& Zhong (2017) and the case company’s model.  
The results for the first research question can be seen summarized in table 3. In short, 
digital platforms with a delivery service make pricing decisions 75% of the time with 
mathematical models. The evidence from the case company provides the remaining share 
and as a pricing model differs notably from the other three delivery pricing models. There 
are no mathematical equations utilized in the case company’s pricing model, other than the 
basic calculations. The most quantitative tool that the case company utilizes is the Excel 
spread sheet cost accounting model for recording price-related information and to calculate 
financial soundness of a location. No other functionalities than subtractions, adding, 
multiplying and dividing is used in this spreadsheet model. It calculates the inputs and 
outputs related to pricing and reveals whether certain price points yield profitable results.  
The three quantitative pricing models for delivery services presented in academic 
literature, all calculate different types of mathematical equations where the inputs are e.g. a 
platform’s membership fee, price elasticity of demand, user’s utility or an optimal number 
of people on one side of the platform. Weyl’s (2010) model considers three-sided 
platforms (newspapers) and two-sided platforms (credit cards). The other models are for 
two-sided platforms. The qualitative models presented in this study are a listing of key 
strategic decisions that a platform needs to take, pricing being one of them.   
As a result, for the first research question, it can be concluded that there is a clear 
tendency towards using mathematical models to reach optimal price levels for platforms 
with a delivery service. The exception to this is the case company’s qualitative model. The 
contribution of the non-delivery pricing models to the first research question, come with a 
reservation. These models study pricing in platforms and in digital platforms, not explicitly 
delivery platforms or any other type of platform for that matter. Should we ignore this fact, 
their contribution would pull the results a bit more towards qualitative models, but this is 
subject to the dilemma described above. I would say that the strongest evidence is from 
those studies explicitly mentioned to be for delivery platforms and thus be mathematically 
dominated.  
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From the interviews conducted with the case company, I learned about a new type of 
price formulating strategy, for which I did not found an equivalent in existing literature. 
The pricing model that the case company uses differs from the other pricing models. It can 
be seen as a mixture of some quantitative modeling (the unit price economics Excel spread 
sheet) and qualitative methods (unprepared, unstructured ex-tempore interviews with 
potential platform users).  Still the model hinges greatly towards being a qualitative model. 
The case company’s methods to reach optimal price points are price benchmarking, 
competitive analysis, background analysis and most importantly the use of local 
knowledge in price determination.  They utilize informal and sometimes even unplanned 
interviews with platform participant groups, to cumulate crucial information on correct 
price points. Granularly, after receiving 10 to 20 opinions from the potential platform 
participants, the case company arrives closer to the price points, with which the service is 
eventually opened. All the price components are added along the way to the cost-
accounting Excel and if the model indicates profitable operations, the company’s service is 
decided to be opened. These prices are not necessarily the final ones, as they might get 
adjusted still by the opinions of the local employees once the decision to open a location is 
made.   
To answer the second research question, there is one important clarification to be 
made. I consider the pricing model of the case company to be a qualitative one. The only 
quantitative part of the pricing model is a spreadsheet model to keep track on the price 
point opinions that are constantly updated to the model as the data collecting process 
cumulates more and more price opinions from platform user group participants. This 
spreadsheet does not contribute to the correctness of the pricing model, other than keeping 
track of the price opinions and providing a clear look on the economics for a certain 
location.   
With this clarification we can answer the second research question. The short answer 
to this question is yes. The evidence for this answer is to a great extent from the case 
company. The pricing guidelines from the qualitative models presented in this study, can 
be seen applicable to delivery platforms as well, and thus contributing to the affirming 
answer of yes to the second research question. However, these guidelines cannot be 
showed to be used explicitly by any certain delivery platform. An example of this type of 
evidence is the finding by Eisenmann et al. (2006). They state that Adobe (a platform with 
digital content delivery) uses a pricing strategy where, the more price sensitive platform 
side is subsidized more and the side of which demand is the most correlated with opposing 
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side’s growth, is charged (Eisenmann et al., 2006). The example they use in their study, is 
a digital platform, but not a physical goods delivery platform. The problem is that, even if 
the company in the example was e.g. Uber, a platform with a delivery service, could this 
type of finding be considered as a strengthening finding to the second research question? 
Taking into consideration that the qualitative pricing models researched in this study 
present similar types of pricing guidelines as the evidence presented above from 
Eisenmann et al.’s (2006) study, their finding can be considered as an affirming finding to 
the second research question. However, as the second research question asks whether a 
delivery platform can make accurate pricing decisions based on a qualitative model, the 
support for this question should be a pricing model from a delivery platform that yields 
price levels. Can these types of pricing guidelines or, phrases describing a platform’s 
pricing, be considered yielding accurate pricing decisions? In my opinion no. In this sense 
the strongest evidence to the second research question is still from the case company, and 
as a finding it is a unique one, as it seems there are now equivalent pricing models 
presented in academic literature.  
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Table 3 Pricing Model Comparisons 
 
    Pricing Model Comparisons         
                
    Delivery   Model is for      Company or industry 
Model Name  Model Type objects Model Measures:  two-sided platforms three-sided platforms method of the model  specific model? 
                
Case Company model Delivery Goods Price opinions /sensitivity Possible Yes User group interviews  Company specific 
Sun et al. model  Delivery People  Waiting times Yes  Not mentioned Mathematical formula Company/ Didi Chuxing 
Kung & Zhong model  Delivery Goods  Utility/ profit maximization Yes Not mentioned Mathematical formula General model  
Riquelme et al. model  Delivery People  Queuing / Dynamic pricing Yes Not directly Mathematical formula Industry specific / Lyft 
Weyl's model  Other - Sources of user heterogeneity Yes (credit cards) Yes (Newspapers) Mathematical formula Industry specific  
Hagiu 2009 model  Other - Profit extraction/maxim. Yes Yes Mathematical formula General model  
Armstrong model Other - Utility/Decision to join Yes Maybe applicable Mathematical formula/listing General model 
Eisenmann model  Other - No model Yes Not directly Guideline listing General model  
Hagiu 2014 Other - No Model Yes Yes Guideline listing General model 
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 Analysis of results  
From the case company’s pricing process, the informal interviews as a source for critical 
pricing data, is the most surprising finding of this study, when compared to the 
mathematics-heavy queuing models. The pricing model of the case company is not a 
qualitative model similar to Hagiu (2014) or Eisenmann et al. (2006) models, which are a 
listing of strategic decision or guidelines contributing to the successfulness of a platform. 
The case company’s pricing model is not similar to the mathematical models either, with 
complex queuing or utility models using mathematical formulas. The case company’s 
model is thus a unique finding as a pricing model. The generality of the case company’s 
pricing model is subject to the business model of a company. Much attention is needed to 
pay to assess whether these types of user group interviews are possible, and can the answer 
be trusted. The more quantitative models could be applicable to the case company at some 
point, although it seems quite unlikely that they would change their current pricing model 
completely. The case company’s pricing strategy allows them, to get the most reliable 
opinions on correct prices for their three platform participant groups. The interviewee 
pointed out that, of course there are better and worse performing locations, but the 
company has not yet had to close a single location because of their pricing decisions. As 
the case company operates in multiple of different locations in different countries, they 
have to assess the correct price levels many times during a year and every time they open a 
new location there are 7 prices to figure out.  
 
Some of the steps in the case company’s pricing process are a bit more common 
when looking at what has been presented in the existing academic literature on the subject. 
These are numerical first-phase background check for a potential location as well as the 
unit economics model, that is used to calculate whether a certain location makes 
economically sense to be opened. The main part of the pricing procedure, however, still 
remains unmatched, from the studies presented in this Thesis. The results from the other 
three pricing models studied in delivery platforms were much more anticipated and more 
align what I was expecting to find from the case company as well.  
The evidence for the goodness of the case company’s pricing model comes from the 
fact that none of the opened locations have been closed. Also, the table 2 (Actual purchases 
vs. Forecasted purchases) provides information about the predictions for correct price 
levels in different locations and the realized price levels. This table serves as the main 
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proof and validation for the second research question. The answer to the second research 
question is that, apparently a digital platform with a delivery service can execute correct 
pricing with a mainly qualitative model, supported by the evidence from the case study.  
 
 Conclusions  
This study was conducted for the purpose of researching pricing methods in digital 
delivery platforms in an explorative manner. The research results of this study serve as an 
overlook to pricing models for digital platforms with a delivery service. The reader learns 
more about pricing models in digital platforms, with a focus on delivery platforms and 
about the dynamics of digital platforms’ pricing in general. Another contribution of the 
study is the presentation of pricing model from real-life. The comparison of the findings 
from the case company to existing models provides an interesting possibility to see the 
differences between academic pricing models and one from real-life. The presentation of 
the case company’s pricing model is the most interesting part of this study. The possibility 
to have access to a real-life business’ complete pricing process was a unique opportunity.  
The quality of the study could have been improved with additional interviewees from 
the case company, but unfortunately that was not possible. However, through the many 
interviews held and emails sent back and forth with the case company representative, I am 
confident that their pricing model is accurately described in this study.  
Some of the pricing models, presented in this study were not from a delivery service, 
but rather from a ride-sourcing service and two from other platform contexts. The 
discussion of how business-type specific these platform pricing models are, is an important 
thing to take into account. The applicability of the case company’s pricing model to other 
digital platform companies is unresearched but the approach to that, was discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
 Discussions  
A platform’s pricing decisions should never be done in a vacuum. The pricing strategy is 
closely related to the platform’s service and market conditions. Another important factor 
for determining an optimal pricing strategy, is the growth phase of the platform. An 
optimal pricing strategy for a platform in its early phase, before critical mass is reached, 
can be very different from the one of a mature phase platform seeking to maximize 
profitability after critical mass of users and the value proposition of the service have been 
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reached. A good example of a pricing decision in the case company was related to price 
benchmarking in competitive locations, “The decision was to operate with shorter 
distances with a lower price than competition but in long distances be more expensive than 
competition.” (Steven, 2019) 
The case company interviewee reflected his thoughts about the early phase pricing 
and pricing tactics given a company’s current goals: “I have spent some time on thinking, 
whether we should have set the price at the same level or a bit higher as the competition, 
because we do have a better service than them, so it would be justified. However, this 
opens up the discussion about the current focus of our firm, which is growth and not 
profitability maximization.” (Steven, 2018). This quote is a good demonstration about the 
intertwined nature of pricing strategy and overall platform strategy, sometimes also 
dictated by the growth stage of a platform. As mentioned earlier, in the early stages of 
platforms, the most important thing is growth in the user numbers, until a critical mass is 
obtained. He further continues: “In addition to this, people are very price sensitive, that is 
why we want to be in par or cheaper than our competition in terms of pricing.” (Steven, 
2018). The case company’s representative has categorized them as a “luxury” service; 
hence the price sensitivity of their users can be expected to be somewhat high. Pricing 
strategy is thus, naturally related to the platform’s service and consumer’s perception of 
the services’ role in their personal life.   
Pricing in platforms is a multifaceted challenge, that all platforms alike face and 
must solve. Pricing cannot be executed in solitude, without considering competitive 
landscape, company’s goals or the maturity or the nature of the service. All these attributes 
should be considered when building a pricing mechanism for a platform company. After 
these factors have been considered, it is reasonable to start screening for an optimal pricing 
model for the company. The model can be a mathematical queuing model, such as Weyl’s 
or a mostly qualitative pricing model, relying on informal interviews with potential 
platform participant groups, such as the one of the case company. The hardest part for a 
platform company, figuring out an optimal pricing strategy and model, is that there is no 
ready formula for this. All the mentioned factors mentioned above should be thought 
through. Of course there can be useful information about a competitor’s pricing model, but 
usually this information is not public and furthermore, if there is a difference in services’ 
nature, e.g. cost-effective vs. more luxury service, this alone can demand for a different 
type of pricing model compared to a competitor’s otherwise similar one.  
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Using mathematical models, such as Weyl (2010) or Kung & Zhong (2017) for 
pricing in the case company, could be an interesting topic for further studies. Somewhat it 
seems that as platforms play with different rules than traditional companies, the current 
mathematics heavy research in pricing models maybe too finetuned for real-life platforms 
to consider as their pricing models. In this sense, the main findings of this study from the 
case company’s pricing model carry significance in the research of pricing in digital 
platforms, especially in real-life context.  
 
6.3.1 Theoretical implications  
Understanding the role that the main findings of this study can have on studying pricing 
models in digital platforms with a delivery service, is probably the most impressive 
theoretical contribution of this thesis. When I researched the topic of pricing models in 
digital platforms and in more precisely in delivery platforms, I found out that it is common 
that new pricing models are an extension of some model presented earlier. This can 
saturate the research towards more precise findings in certain models but contributing the 
literature with a stand-alone and working pricing model, can steer the research towards 
more real-life focused. In this sense the pricing model of the case company, described in 
detail in this study can serve as a base model for qualitative pricing models in delivery 
platforms or as a supportive finding in this category, should there emerge other similar 
findings.  
On my opinion, with digital platform pricing models, the research agenda should be 
tied more to the performance that the models bring. Examples of complex mathematical 
models are presented in literature to reach optimal price points for platforms, but the 
evidence from real life is something that would validate a model effectively. The power of 
a pricing model is in its applicability to real-life businesses. In general, it would be nice to 
see more research made with case studies. For example, as Kung & Zhong (2017), present 
their model, it would be nice to know whether this model is actually used by some delivery 
company, or is it only their own best-guess for a delivery platform. In this sense, I would 
say that the most convincing theoretical contribution of my study, is presenting a pricing 
model for a digital platform with a delivery service, that is known to be in use, and there is 
evidence provided on its performance, (see Table 2, in section 3.11.).  
It is understandable that companies are very secretive about their pricing models, and 
maybe e.g. Kung & Zhong (2017) are not allowed to mention whether the pricing model 
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they present, has some real-life applicability. This is a clear difficulty when studying 
pricing in general; the access to data and pricing models in companies.  
I consider the method that the case company uses to price their service a somewhat 
unique, compared to other pricing models that I found from current academic literature. 
This means that the uniqueness of the model in the study context is true when reflected to 
current academic literature. Another theoretical aspect is the applicability of this pricing 
model. At a first look, the biggest restriction of the model is the business type that it will 
be suitable for. This pricing model should work equally well for two, three and multiple 
sided platforms. The number of the sides in a platform should not be a restriction.  
 
6.3.2 Managerial implications  
As the case company’s pricing model relies on unstructured interviews, for the model to be 
applicable to other types of businesses, first there should be a possibility for the other 
companies to interview their potential platform participant groups. This method requires 
that a potential user is knowledgeable enough about the service to able give a valid opinion 
for the correct price level. Thus, this type of questioning model will work best for platform 
services that have a service that is easily understandable, and the potential users can be 
interviewed.  With the condition that a platform participant understands a service, their 
opinions are valuable in planning the correct pricing for a platform.  
All platforms that provide a service, of which core benefit can be communicated 
clearly to platform participant groups, should be able to benefit from this type of pricing 
model. A restricting factor to this is apparently service innovativeness. The platform 
operators need to take into account that with this type of pricing model, highly innovative 
ideas can end up with a wide range of opinions, with differing opinions as the idea is 
understood incorrectly. The high and low levels of expected utility are subject to personal 
preferences and misinterpretation of the platform service’s value proposition. 
 Contribution to existing research  
I present in this study a relevant, proven-to-be successful pricing model for a multisided 
digital platform with a delivery service. The key findings of the study are the data 
gathering method of the case company’s pricing model.  Researching and presenting the 
case company’s pricing model in its entirety is the greatest contribution to academic 
literature, as I am able to show that a similar type of pricing model was not found on 
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academic literature. The contribution extends its applicability to real-life businesses as the 
model has been used for several years and continues to be used for 100% of the pricing 
decision made in the case company. I was also able to show that, a qualitative pricing 
model with interview-based data gathering method can yield accurate pricing decisions.   
 Restrictions of the study 
One of the restrictions to this study, is to understand that rarely companies will be open 
about their pricing processes and the tactics they use to formulate prices. This can affect to 
the fact that there are no similar models presented in existing literature. Publications on 
this topic usually include a mathematical queuing model or a qualitative listing of 
guidelines for pricing model possibilities and a comparison of their performance in one 
ecosystem. This leads to that there are only models presented in research that are not firm 
specific pricing models. This is understandable and might also diminish the findings of this 
study.  
A second clear restriction to the results of this study is that many of the studies used 
in this research, state that they are examined in two-sided platforms, e.g. Hagiu (2009) and 
Weyl (2010).  Their applicability to the case company can be challenged. Strictly speaking, 
two-sided and three-sided platforms are different. However, the differences between them 
can be quite marginal and the three-sided platform can have the same functionalities in it 
than a two-sided platform. The applicability of pricing models across different types of 
platforms, with differing business models, is a more restraining factor in my eyes, than the 
number of sides of the platform.  
 Further studies 
The topic of pricing and platforms is an interesting one. It would be fascinating to learn 
more about data collection based on interviews and on informal discussions as a pricing 
tactic. Based on what I have learned during this study is that, this type of pricing method 
can work effectively if conducted with care and thought. A practical matter is that this type 
of data collection method requires time and effort, but it does yield results, otherwise 
probably unattainable. Another interesting study topic would be using mathematical 
models, such as Weyl (2010) and Kung & Zhong (2017), in platforms that are used to price 
their service with qualitative models, e.g. the case company. This type of study could be 
interesting, especially for the more mature locations of these types of platforms.   
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Appendix A: Subsidization calculations, Weyl model  
Table A1: The cost of delivery on average 
Service Location 1.  Northern Europe Price of one product 
average purchase  97,97203042 48,98601521   
Cost of Delivery 13,08   13 % 
        
Service Location 2.  Northern Europe     
average purchase  80,56972395 40,28486198   
Cost of Delivery 11,64   14 % 
        
Service Location 3.  Eastern Europe     
average purchase  40,13385344 20,06692672   
Cost of Delivery 4,5   11 % 
        
Service Location 4 Eastern Europe     
average purchase  26,97 13,485   
Cost of Delivery 4,77   18 % 
        
Service Location 5.  South Europe     
average purchase  49,77 24,885   
Cost of Delivery 0   0 % 
        
        
Total Average     11 % 
 
These are not the actual prices; they have been randomized, but the ratios are correct and 
thus the percentages.   
 
 
